Challenges for Integrated Peacekeeping Operations
Concerning Socio-Economic Aspects and the Capability for a
Comprehensive Assessment of the Effects on Existing UN
Policies in the Conflict Area

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1. Introduction

This report will give an overview of a rather complex and complicated subject matter. It deals with the question of importance of future peace operations, the socio-economic effects of the “third generation” of peacekeeping. These missions usually also involve aspects of peacebuilding. Beyond eliminating the use of violence and/or maintaining peace, operations try to establish the rule of law, improve governance in the area of operation and promote reconciliation so that armed conflict is no longer considered to be a mechanism for dispute resolution. But these integrated peacekeeping operations (PKOs) also have broader objectives, like those related to economic development, which, in particular, should benefit the local population.

The analysis will concentrate on United Nations-led missions, mandated by the Security Council. These operations have been studied more closely than the missions led by NATO, the European Union or the African Union.

2. The Background of Peacekeeping Operations

The origins of these ideas go back to the early 1990s. When Boutros Boutros-Ghali became UN Secretary-General in 1992, he published the seminal Agenda for Peace, in which he added to the Security Council’s notions of “preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping” his own concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding”, an important element for the promotion of “sustainable economic and social development.”1 He defined peacebuilding as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali also initiated in
1992 a reorganisation of the whole peacekeeping structure of the United Nations. One of his first decisions was to establish the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN Secretariat in New York.\(^3\)

In his *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, published in 1995, Boutros-Ghali admitted that the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding can be “complicated.” It would require “integrated action” as well as “delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict” in respect of which peacebuilding activities are to be undertaken.\(^4\)

It was against the background of the failures of the UN Peace Operations in Rwanda, and particularly the peace-enforcement operations in Somalia and Bosnia, that new, more comprehensive peace operations were established. One of the first of these operations was UNTAES (United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium), established by a Security Council mandate in early 1996.\(^5\) In its mandate, the civilian element of UNTAES was tasked with the “assistance in the coordination of plans for the development and economic reconstruction of the region.”\(^6\) Other complex integrated peacebuilding missions, established in the mid to late 1990s, were operations in Bosnia, Guatemala, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and DR Congo.\(^7\) Resolution 1031 (1995) of the Security Council authorised NATO to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia. The mandate only indirectly referred to economic reconstruction in citing Annex 10 of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement.

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Resolution 1244 (1999) of the Security Council granted the NATO-led KFOR (Kosovo Force) authority to establish a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It required that the United Nations exercise the sovereign prerogatives of a state for the first time.\(^8\) It authorised UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) to establish an interim civilian administration under which the people could progressively enjoy substantial autonomy. The Resolution had little to say about socio-economic rebuilding, only in paragraph 11 did it assign UNMIK the responsibility for “supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction.”

Still, the mandate was unprecedented in its scope and complexity. One of the lessons learned by UNMIK in relation to socio-economic effects was expressed by Michael J. Dziedzic:

> Peace must pay so the coalition for peace can prevail. Peace is a political agenda, and as with any political agenda, local political leaders must be willing to carry it forward. Elites willing to take risks for peace and their supporters must benefit from the peace process if their backing is to be maintained. Ensuring tangible improvement in the quality of life by expeditiously restoring basic public services should be a top priority. Peace has to pay for all the parties to the conflict, moreover, if they are to develop a stake in sustaining peace.\(^9\)

The *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Report), published in 2000 and a reaction to the rather mixed results of the peace operations in the 1990s, defined peacebuilding as activities which “reassemble the foundations of peace” to build something that is “more than just the absence of war.” Among its activities the report included: reintegrating of former combatants into civilian society; strengthening the rule of law; improving respect for human rights; technical assistance for democratic development; conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques; support for the fight against corruption; demining programs; and action against infectious diseases.\(^10\)

The to a certain extent disappointing *World Summit* in New York, 14 to 16 September 2005, had as its most important outcome the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body. The Summit

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9 Ibid. 380.

acknowledged in this connection the need for a “coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding,” with a view to achieve “sustainable peace,” which should lay the foundation for “sustainable development.”\footnote{11}

In 2007, the Department of Field Support (DFS) was created by the new UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, intended to assist in carrying out the increasingly complex tasks of peace operations. It oversees daily field support operations in the areas of personnel, finance, information and communication technology, and logistics necessary to mount, direct, and sustain United Nations’ field-based peace operations world-wide.\footnote{12} Both the DPKO and the DFS use integrated and shared capacities.

Together the DPKO and the new DFS published the so-called Capstone Doctrine in 2008. This internal DPKO/DFS paper sits at the “highest level” of the doctrine framework for UN peacekeeping. All subordinate directives and guidelines issued by DPKO/DFS should “conform to the principles and concepts” referred to in this document.\footnote{13}

According to the Doctrine, the changes in international politics have given rise to a new generation of “multi-dimensional” UN peacekeeping operations. They are often deployed in the aftermath of a violent internal conflict and usually employ military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement.\footnote{14} Table 1 on page 7 gives a list of tasks for this kind of peacekeeping operation. Besides the peacekeepers in the narrow sense, the tasks are tackled by an array of actors, as for example the UN family, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, NGOs, the Red Cross etc.

\footnote{14} Cf. ibid. 22.
Table 1

The Core Business of Multidimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Indicative Post-Conflict Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the Doctrine, “[s]ocio-economic recovery and development is critical to the achievement of a lasting peace.” Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are “rarely mandated to play a direct role in the promotion of socio-economic recovery and development.” Therefore, the multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations play a “more limited supporting role”. Nevertheless, United Nations peacekeeping operations may “assist” the work of development partners.15 In addition, such peacekeeping operations often implement Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The Capstone Doctrine describes QIPs the following way:

[They] are small-scale projects, designed to benefit the population. QIPs may take a number of forms, including infrastructure assistance or short-term employment

15 Cf. ibid. 29.
generation activities. QIPs establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate and the peace process.16

In this context, the Doctrine warns against “conflating” politico-military activities with humanitarian operations. Humanitarian actors could have concerns that QIPs or Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects are regarded as being of a humanitarian nature, when they see these as “primarily serving political, security or reconstruction priorities”.17

For the Doctrine, UN peacekeeping operations function through a mix of civilian contracted services procured by the UN and military support capabilities, which are provided through “lease” arrangements between the UN and contributing Member States.18 Usually, contingents arrive with supplies for 30 to 90 days to maintain self-sufficiency. During that period, the UN enters into service contracts to provide the bulk supplies of a mission, such as water, rations, laundry, waste disposal and some transport services. Contingents bringing their own equipment are paid for the lease of this equipment by the United Nations, based on agreed reimbursement rates.19

According to the Capstone Doctrine, the activities of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation should support and, where necessary, build national capacity. Any “displacement of national or local capacity should be avoided” wherever possible.20 Another concern of the Doctrine is the (perceived) impact of the UN operation’s “human and material footprint.” Besides social (such as different cultural norms) and environmental impacts (for example, waste management or water usage), it stresses the possible “major impact on the host economy.” Peacekeeping operations could push up the price of local housing and accommodation, or place demands on local producers for staple foods and materials, thus placing such items out of reach of the local community. These effects could “have the potential for creating friction and discontent within the

16 Ibid. 30.
17 Ibid. 30. Here the abbreviation “CIMIC” stands for “Civil Military Coordination”, on p. 94 it stands for “Civil-Military Cooperation”.
18 Cf. ibid. 77.
19 Cf. ibid. 91 and footnote 7.
20 Ibid. 40.
local population” and should be “continuously monitored and managed by the mission’s leadership.”

At the invitation of the Security Council, the Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict from June 2009 considered “how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively.” Experience and analysis accumulated over the last two decades, as well as numerous interviews conducted with national and international practitioners for the preparation of the Report, pointed to several recurring areas where international assistance has been frequently requested as a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The Report mentions five areas in this regard: support for basic safety and security; support for the political process (including elections); provision of basic services and the safe return of refugees; restoring core government functions. The fifth point includes:

Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

The Report adds that “[j]ump-starting economic recovery can be one of the greatest bolsters of security, and provides the engine for future recovery.” One of the greatest challenges, according to the Report, is to ensure that “actions or decisions taken in the short term do not prejudice medium and long-term peacebuilding.” There is no single template that can be applied to the complex situations of peacebuilding; maintaining “flexibility and adaptability are essential.” In the final instance, it is largely “the leaders on the ground, both national and international, who can ensure that vision, strategy and decision-making respond effectively to the realities of an ever-changing situation.”

21 Ibid. 81-82.
23 Ibid. par.17; also par. 58.
24 Ibid. par.18.
25 Ibid. par. 20.
26 Ibid. par. 22.
27 Ibid. par. 89.
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost for UN Field Operations</th>
<th>US$ Million, 2008/2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other civilian (government provided, electoral observers, consultants)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick impact projects</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special equipment</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official travel</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval transportation</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other supplies, services and equipment</td>
<td>176.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground transportation</td>
<td>187.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and information technology</td>
<td>289.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transportation</td>
<td>867.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities and infrastructure</td>
<td>959.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian personnel</td>
<td>1341.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; police personnel</td>
<td>2829.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note*: Figures based on approved 1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009 resources for peacekeeping operations; not included: support to African Union Mission in Somalia.


In the 2009 *New Horizon* Non-Paper of DPKO and DFS the two Departments aim to strengthen UN peacekeeping for tomorrow. The budget of UN peacekeeping has “soared to nearly $7.8 billion a year,” over 116,000 persons are deployed across 15 missions. Table 2 shows the different cost elements of UN field operations for 2008/2009.

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In addition, Table 3 displays the scope and magnitude UN field operations have. The large number of procurement transactions is of particular interest for the further discussion here.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Peacekeeping: Support Facts and Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN aircraft in peacekeeping missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN vehicles in peacekeeping missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of daily fuel consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily water provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily power generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of peacekeeping procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transactions in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of peacekeeping procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transactions in 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Both Departments underline again the immediate peacebuilding priorities of the Secretary-General’s Report in their New Horizon Non-Paper but admit that UN peacekeeping “is not well equipped to tackle the social and economic dimensions of peacebuilding;” the UN relies on others to provide sustainable development and capacity-building support.29

The Global Field Support Strategy announced in the Non-Paper was published in January 2010 in a Report of the Secretary-General. The Strategy explains that each peacekeeping mission mandate is unique and therefore, each support delivery mechanisms have to be invented anew:

[A]n on-the-ground assessment must be conducted and a budget prepared in accordance with the Security Council mandate. A fully justified staffing table must be devised and the critical and necessary equipment identified, prepared, inspected and transported to the mission areas. Appropriate memorandums of understanding

29 Cf. ibid. 23.
and letters of assist must be negotiated, and forces must be identified, prepared and deployed. Land for housing and mission operations must be secured and improved, contracts for every product and every service, from gravel to aircraft operations, must be negotiated. International staff must be attracted and recruited, and local staff must be identified and hired. For these reasons, the process of planning, mounting and deploying a new operation can take, on average, from 6 to 12 months.\(^\text{30}\)

The new Strategy wants to change the provisions for support to the field missions, aiming to deliver timely, high-quality integrated services to missions. It foresees a reinforced division of labor and the relocation of functions: The Secretariat in New York (i.e. the DFS) will continue to set the strategic direction, exercise oversight and take policy decisions. Global and regional service centres will undertake operational and transactional functions; the regional centres will also integrate support teams from various missions to support a region. Location-dependent activities will continue to be performed in-mission (i.e. at the location of the mission); they include activities, such as cash management and equipment support services.\(^\text{31}\) This “global approach” will “simplify systems, avoid duplication with field operations, ensure consistency in best practices, prioritise efforts in areas of critical importance and achieve economies of scale in resourcing requirements.”\(^\text{32}\) At the end of July 2010, senior officials announced that the General Assembly “was poised to approve” the new Strategy to match the global enterprise into which peacekeeping has evolved.\(^\text{33}\)

3. The Socio-economic Effects of Peace Operations

In multidimensional peace operations, the military contingents will be the first on the ground in an often war-torn country. In this early phase of the mission, these troops are practically the only element which possesses the necessary resources for a rapid and speedy socio-economic improvement of the situation on the ground. Since the military has rather extensive requirements for per-

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31 Cf. ibid. par. 18, 22, 23.

32 Ibid. par. 37.

sonnel and material supplies, it can be in a way an “early market” for local staff and providers of goods. Economic incentives for the local society may not only increase the trust of the locals in the mission, in addition they also could serve as force protection for the military. Moreover, the military can also provide resources for improving the local situation, for example, through building up or upgrading the (damaged) infrastructure. These activities have to be linked to the needs of the local population by creating networks among the relevant actors. Finally, the actions ought to be “trailblazers” for a sustainable socio-economic development.

After these general remarks on the possible (positive) effects of multidimensional peace operations, four issues will now be discussed in greater detail: the overall impact of operations, the impact on the price level, on the labor market and on procurement.

3.1. The Overall Socio-economic Impact

In the New Horizon Non-Paper mentioned above, the authors stress that

UN peacekeepers play a critical role in building peace after conflict, in establishing the conditions for recovery and development activities, and in carrying out some of the tasks essential to stabilization and early consolidation of peace.34

In modern peacekeeping operations the first task of peacekeepers (i.e. the troops on the ground) is to create a stable and secure environment in an area that has often been devastated by war. The establishment of peace and security is a pre-condition for the population to begin with (legal) economic activities. However, beyond this most important indirect contribution of peacekeeping to a nation’s economic recovery, there are also direct economic effects:

[The way] in which the peace and security are provided can either enhance or detract from that level of development and from the sustainability of peace and stability. Mission structure, procurement decisions, hiring decisions, and decisions by staff on how to spend their mission subsistence allowances (MSA) all influence

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an operation’s “economic footprint”[emphasis added], that is its impact on the local economy.35

The expenses of the participants in peacekeeping operations has a rather high potential: if well applied, it can “kick-start” a local economy at a time when this is most needed and therefore assist in the restoration of peace and stability. The overall assumption of this comprehensive study is “that United Nations missions do more good and less damage, in economic terms, than is commonly believed.”36 There is an “immediate upsurge” in economic activity and the expenditures of the UN missions provide “a stimulus to the local economy.”37

It is not easy to calculate what peacekeeping operations actually spend at a theatre of operations. According to William Durch, the three main categories of local expenses by peacekeeping missions are:

(1) living allowances distributed in cash for UN staff and experts, the Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA); for UN Volunteers the Volunteer Living Allowance (VLA);

(2) the salaries of locally-hired mission staff (the “national staff”);

(3) the local content of mission procurement (goods and services originating in the state hosting the mission).38

These are actually “incidental cash injections” that peacekeeping operations give the local economy by deploying and performing their job. They are not intended as development efforts.39 Across the nine missions analysed by Carnahan et al., the spending of allowances had the largest impact on the local economy. It represented over half of the impact in four missions and between 40


36 Ibid. 1.

37 Ibid. 51.

38 Cf. Durch, William. The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: An Update. In: Feichtinger, Walter, Markus Gauster, and Fred Tanner (eds.). Economic Impacts of Crisis Response Operations. An Underestimated Factor in External Engagement. Vienna–Geneva: Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, April 2010 (= Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 5/2010/S, in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)). 157–189 (158). Not included are the salaries (even the living allowances per diem) of the international staff, which usually are not spent in the area of operation, as well as the procurement of imported goods and services.

39 Cf. ibid. 158.
and 50 percent in four others. The local content of procurement provided the second largest overall impact. In four of the missions it contributed over 40 percent of the total. National staff salaries had the lowest impact, although in four missions national salaries exceeded 20 percent of the missions’ total local impact. Overall, the local impact (including the Keynesian multiplier effect calculated by Carnahan et al.) of the peacekeeping missions was rather large in some missions: In two out of the nine missions it constituted around 10 percent of GDP; in two other peacekeeping missions it was slightly more than 6 percent; in the rest it was below 4 percent. Thus, a “significant economic boost is provided at a time when the economy needs it most.” A later study tried to estimate the amount of money contributed to the host states’ economy by eight UN operations during four fiscal years (2004/5–2007/8); the estimates range from $1.5 to $1.8 billion.

3.2. The Impact on the Price Level

One unintended consequence of these “cash injections” is the possible rise in prices for goods and services, in short, inflation. Carnahan et al. maintain that the “perception of widespread inflation is not borne out”, price rises that occur are only found “in small pockets of the economy servicing internationals.” The update published four years later gives similar results. An account of the UNAMET/UNTAET mission in East Timor showed that the inflation in East Timor was lower in 2000 than in 1998, before the deployment of the UN missions. Still, there was inflation for consumer goods purchased by members of the UN mission; but this did not cause a permanent increase of the inflation rate in East Timor. Looking at other case studies, this relatively “benign” effect of

41 Cf. ibid. 15.
42 Ibid. 17.
44 Carnahan et al. (2006:51).
the peacekeepers’ local spending was not so obvious. A study of Kosovo states that the international presence has led to increased prices for goods and services for nationals, taking “prices beyond the reach of the local populations.”47

3.3. The Impact on the Labour Market

The effects of hiring local (national) staff on the labour market of the mission area is widely debated. Some argue that the hiring of national staff would be the “quickest and most effective way to inject much needed funds into the local economy”. Others claim that the peacekeeping missions “hired the best administrative staff at rates that the national government and the private sector could not compete with.”48

A more detailed analysis found that employing national staff caused obvious savings in the peacekeeping mission budget, since international staff would cost four to five times (Kosovo) or even between ten and fifty times (Afghanistan) more per month.49 Thus, cleaning staff, drivers, interpreters, technicians and administrative support staff are usually hired among the local populations.50 Skills acquired through working with the international organisation, as well as on the job training, formal schooling and mentoring from their colleagues could have a positive medium and long-term impact on the local and national economy: a rise in productivity and, as a result, an internationally more competitive economy. This could be realised through subsequent employment outside the mission structure and even through the provision of cash flow for investment in small business ventures. Employing national staff would moreover “enhance the legitimacy” of peacekeeping missions.51

48 Carnahan et al. (2006:29).
Negative unintended effects could be a “brain drain” of the highly qualified employees from national or local jobs. The much higher wage scales of UN missions not only influence local employment, but also the development agencies and NGOs operating in the area. In Kosovo, higher wages resulted in price rises for standard commodities, forcing locals to take more than one job to be able to support their family. An author even goes further and maintains the “detrimental impact of international salaries on a poor local population” in Kosovo which “encourages corruption.” In addition and to make matters worse, this trap “proved impossible to evade.”

An additional problem related to the different employment opportunities is the “dual public sector syndrome.” In Kosovo and Afghanistan public sector assistance and services are provided both by the national government and the UN mission and other international groups.

3.4. Local Procurement

As already mentioned, local content of procurement has the second largest overall impact on the local economy. Table 3 on page 11 showed the large number of peacekeeping procurement transactions taking place each year. Every peacekeeping mission needs accommodation facilities, office space, transportation and communication facilities, computer systems and a range of consumable goods, from oil to paper to bottled water.

The use of local office space and housing options, as opposed to purpose-built UN compounds, can provide a significant stimulus for economic recovery. It has a significant impact on the development of the construction and

54 Ammitzboell (2007:77-78).
57 Cf. Carnahan et al. (2006:48). The authors add that mission leadership must take into account the security considerations before encouraging staff use of local housing.
contracting industries, generating both business income and jobs. Employment in this sector also brings workers into the formal labor force. Since businesses in this sector usually have to be registered and have to comply with government regulations, construction and contracting will drag them out of the informal economy, thus generating tax revenues for the government.\textsuperscript{58}

Basically, contracting for goods and services for missions can be done locally or from headquarters. In addition, local procurement can also be managed by troop contributing countries (TCCs). In EU-led missions, many procurement activities have to be organised by the TCCs. An analysis of the procurement by the Austrian contingent of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA Mission showed that it spent almost €1 million between March 2008 and December 2009 for local procurement with some 190 local businesses. The amounts of money spent went from €1,52 on the local market in Arbéché (Chad) to one transaction of €175,000.\textsuperscript{59} The experience of the Austrian contingent shows that even small sums can help to stimulate the local economy. The trick is to identify the potential of the local situation and to communicate with the other actors (TCCs, NGOs etc.) on the ground.

The UN Procurement Manual establishes the “Best Value for Money” principle, but “price alone is not necessarily determinative” for this principle.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, it should provide sufficient flexibility for missions to increase local procurement.\textsuperscript{61} Some resolutions by the General Assembly outline the principles governing outsourcing decisions.\textsuperscript{62}

There exists a tendency towards centralisation of global procurement, since there seem to be possible savings through managing procurement from headquarters. Some ambiguity can be clearly observed in the Global Field Support Strategy mentioned above. The Strategy states that the typical environment of a peacekeeping mission today “is remote, austere and, increasingly,

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Carnahan et al. (2006 :25).
\textsuperscript{59} I want to thank Thomas Truong from the Austrian Ministry of Defence for providing me with information on EUFOR Tchad/RCA.
\textsuperscript{60} United Nations. Department of Management, Office of Central Support Services, Procurement Division. Procurement Manual. Revision 6, March 2010, Chapter 1, point 1.2.
\textsuperscript{61} Cf. Carnahan et al. (2006 :26).
dangerous” as well as “[l]ocal markets for goods and services are limited or non-existent.” Global and regional service centres should be established, “only location-dependent activities [would be] performed in specific mission locations.” On the other hand, mission impact objectives should also be to “[f]ully utilize local and regional investment and capacity.” In addition, the system of contingent-owned equipment (COE) brings more responsibility for the TCCs in procurement transactions.

Again, as in all activities in war-torn areas, a skill (by of the UN or the TCCs) is needed to balance the requirements of a mission against the socio-economic development of the host country.

3.5. Preliminary Conclusions

The points debated above show that any analysis of the socio-economic impact of peacekeeping operations has to deal with a rather complex reality. One has to start with the background to PKOs, i.e. the economic situation during the war/military operations, the so-called conflict economy. The latter often includes a shadow economy, which reduces formal economic activities and leads to the growth of an informal sector.


64 Ibid. 3.
Figure 1

Improvement of the Socio-economic Impact of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase the intended socio-economic impact of PKO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procurement: support local suppliers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) strengthen local procurement without depriving locals of basic goods and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) encourage moderate and stable price level (keep inflation low)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) support formal enterprises to raise GDP and taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring of nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) increase adequate professional hiring of locals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) support and train local security forces to stimulate the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) enable local staff to apply for subsequent employment opportunities and create small business ventures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieve socio-economic PKO objectives to enhance future self-sustainability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

People adapt their behaviour, trying to survive and maximise the economic opportunities which occurred due to the economic transformation brought about by armed conflict. The effects of these “economies” outlast a conflict and become a concern of peacebuilding.65

To avoid public disappointment during the immediate post-conflict situation, a “priority for post-conflict economic policy is to support the creation of peace dividends.” Another policy priority is to create “labour and education opportunities”. In addition, the capacity-building for the state is important; this can be achieved, for example, through “the gradual co-option of the informal into the formal economy” by increasing the tax revenue.66

With this background, Figure 1 on page 20 tries to introduce some of the complex tasks for a PKO when attempting to increase its intended positive impacts on the country it operates in. Two of such significant responsibilities concern procurement and the hiring of local people (nationals). The final goal of every PKO must be the self-sustainability of a country’s socio-economic development.

4. Questions for Future Peacekeeping Operations

There will be no magic wand to make PKOs take care effectively of all the problems related to their socio-economic effects. Each operation will have to find ways for improving the situation of the local population after ending the military conflict and during the establishment of a stable and secure environment.

Here follows a (partial) list of questions, the answers to which have to be found for each PKO, individually.

4.1. What Is the Local Situation?

Before a decision is made on whether to launch a PKO, a thorough (strategic) assessment of the theater of operation (the host country) has to be made. This must also include the evaluation of the socio-economic situation and an estimation of possibilities for local procurement, hiring of nationals etc.

Attention has to be paid to issues which are often not so well understood or taken into account, as for example:

- cultural factors, including religion;
- bureaucracy, acting differently from business;
- what business opportunities exist due to the conflict economy; etc.

4.2. How to Proceed?

The immediate post-conflict situations are usually rather complex and difficult to manage. For PKOs it is the “golden hour” to improve not only the security, but also the socio-economic situation of the local population. In the final instance, coherence between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development is of critical importance.

There are several general principles that have to be heeded, especially during the early phase of PKOs.

Transparency

PKOs have to act with as much transparency as possible:

- This will help to gain trust and confidence from the population.
- It will increase the accountability of the operation.
- The PKO will get feedback from the beneficiaries more easily.
- At the same time, transparency will be an disincentive for anti-social behaviour, like corruption and organised crime.
Information Exchange

In general, the *exchange of information* among all participants during the activities in the territory is crucial for positive socio-economic effects of PKOs.

- It should support *coordination* among the actors in the host country, the troop contributing countries, the police contributing countries, the NGOs and the local actors.
- It can make the achievement of *consensus* on important issues among the actors easier.
- In addition, establishing *databases* including this and other information would be useful, in particular regarding the quick rotation (e.g. six months) of the peacekeepers.
- The Peacebuilding Commission has an overarching responsibility in this field.

Civil-Military Interaction

Exchange of information is also an element of *CIMIC* and the (often difficult) *coordination* of military and humanitarian agencies. In fact, *civil military interaction* is the prerequisite for the whole government or comprehensive approach in peacekeeping.67

NATO defines CIMIC as “coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organisations and agencies.” It adds that “the immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO Commander and the civilian authorities, … to allow him to fulfil his mission.”68 A similar definition is used by the EU, which has also developed the notion of

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68 Quoted from AJP-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (June, 2003), points 102, 103.
Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), differing from CIMIC in that it deals with the relationship between the military and civilians within the EU itself.69

Within the UN system, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) have defined the relationship between military and humanitarian organisations. They have coined the term “CMCoord” (Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination) to describe the civil-military interface. Documents relating to the concept include the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief”, also known as the “Oslo Guidelines” (from May 1994); additional guidelines regulate military escorts for humanitarian convoys using military assets in complex emergencies.70

As already mentioned when discussing the Capstone Doctrine, humanitarian organisations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), stress the need to preserve the humanitarian space and to ensure that any relationship with the military is not to the detriment of the fundamental humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and humanity. Since military actors remain the instruments of the states that send them, the independence and credibility of humanitarian agencies are difficult to reconcile with a close cooperation with the military. But there is a paradox that cannot be negated: while humanitarian workers may need protection from the military as they fulfil their missions, their association with the military may jeopardise their own security.71

For coordination on the field, it would therefore not be desirable to establish a “centralised, hierarchical information mechanism” for peacebuilding, which could hamper the independence of humanitarian actors. But it is also unrealistic to expect a “loose network” of actors to remedy its coordination problems simply through information sharing. The challenge, according to Roland Paris, is to


“strike a balance” between preserving the flexibility of the existing loose networked structure and the requirement for some measure of hierarchy. What is needed, in short, is a “directed” network that more effectively combines elements of hierarchy and decentralised autonomy.72

Capacity Building

Another important ingredient for intended socio-economic effects of PKOs concerns capacity building. Individuals, groups and the government have to be able to again perform functions after the military conflict. According to Türk (2009), priorities in the immediate post-conflict environment are: reconstructing at least rudimentary housing and infrastructure as well as providing access to essential public services, such as water, sanitation, energy (in particular power supply), communications, transport, health, and education. These activities should restore some sense of normalcy and order and build confidence among the population.73

These short-term measures can be also tackled through the already mentioned Quick Impact Projects, intended to provide fast-dispersing money for multiple, small projects. According to Durch, they are the only line in peacekeeping mission budgets that can be directed to the outside of the mission to effect, for example, small infrastructure repairs, rather than toward direct mission needs. Their flexibility and ability to provide services for the community may increase or reinforce a mission’s local legitimacy.74


74 Cf. Durch (2010:177); the author points to the fact that QIPs “are an under-evaluated tool whose actual value is largely unknown”. MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) appears to have the best-organised QIPs programme. It spent about $2 million of its 2007–08 budget for 176 QIPs, with projects averaging $11,200 each; data from Durch, who quotes United Nations, Financial Performance Report of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, A/63/549, p. 46.
Short Term — Long Term

These activities are clearly focused on the short-term effect. Most mandates of the Security Council extend only for six months. But this timespan is much too short for larger infrastructure projects, for instance. A case in point: Instead of building roads, UNTAET in East Timor rented helicopters for just six months.75 Longer-term staffing contracts and project budgeting would enable improved local capacity building so that the generation of competent local staff could take over central competencies of the international administration.76 Peacekeepers must not ignore the fact that positive short-term measures can lead to long-term difficulties for a society. The passage from emergency assistance to development and sustainable peace should be the aim of PKOs.77

Managing Expectations

After war and destruction, PKOs usually generate high expectations among the local population concerning their most pressing needs. In countries emerging from conflict and/or at risk of violence, resource scarcities and institutional weaknesses will limit what can be achieved. Therefore, expectations of the local populations need to be managed carefully for the PKOs to maintain their credibility. Key actors and citizens do not judge performance on the basis of a mission’s performance, but on the impact of the activities on their lives. Security and socio-economic objectives are interrelated, and changing expectations in one area requires complementary actions in others.78

Flexibility

In situations where surprises are likely and quick adaptation is essential, flexibility is called for. Postwar peacekeeping is an exceptionally unpredictable and uncertain enterprise. The missions take place in volatile environments where there is a relatively high likelihood of violence, compared to conditions in other developing states. In addition, these missions are multi-faceted and actions taken in one area — political, social or economic — have the potential to generate unforeseen results in other areas. Finally, peacekeepers have only limited knowledge of what is required to succeed in stabilising a fragile country after war. According to Paris (2009), the ability of peacekeepers to adapt and react quickly to changing circumstances and surprises — including revising specific strategies that are producing unforeseen and undesirable effects — is a key to preventing small problems from swelling into crises that threaten the peace and success of the mission. Therefore, rigid or overly bureaucratic forms of international coordination could reduce the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping. 79

4.3. How to Implement? 80

The analysis of the intricacies of post-conflict situations and the theoretical and empirical analysis of intended positive effects of PKOs leads to the question how PKOs have to be organised to implement these findings.

In the context of the United Nations, it is primarily the Security Council through its mandates for PKOs which has to instruct and monitor the actors on the ground. In multidimensional peace missions, the part of the mandate that deals with horizontal issues, like the protection of civilians, could also include a short and straightforward paragraph on the activities of the operation with regard to its socio-economic effects. The Security Council could also ask the Secretary-General and the Secretariat to address the issues concerning the socio-economic effects and (intended) consequences of PKOs. A briefing by the Secretariat for the UN member states could be useful. Alternatively, a

79 Cf. Paris (2009: 63). Here the author discusses postwar “statebuilding” but his remarks are relevant for peacekeeping operations in general.

80 This sections draws on the very useful proposals of Krawinkler (2010:40–44).
recommendation, proposal or conclusion could be made by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

In case this is not feasible, the *Concept of Operations* and/or accompanying mission *Rules of Engagement* for the military component or the *Directives on the Use of Force* for the police component, respectively, could include the task to consider the socio-economic consequences of their duties.

The *European Union* bases most of its crisis management operations on UN Security Council resolutions. Here the civilian aspects of crisis management and its promoting the broad understanding of “human security” could be the basis for more regard to the socio-economic effects of missions.

*Local procurement* can have an important effect on the local economy. The United Nations Procurement Manual could be further adapted to strengthen local procurement. The training of *contracting officers*, as it is done in UN Member States, could help to improve the acquisition of local goods and services also at the UN level.

Like the other actions suggested here, hiring *national staff* is essentially a measure based on existing structures in the host country. Qualified on-site candidates which cannot find a job presently could be listed in a kind of “In-Mission Local Personnel Roster.” This Roster could be organised by the UN mission, being an example of an on-site knowledge management and networking of relevant actors.

*Quick Impact Projects* could be extended to foster small businesses and could, in the long run, be supported by foreign donors to further enhance economic development. Changes of the tax exempt status of UN missions are not realistic, but the privileges of duty free shops (“PX” stores) should be valid only for a limited time so that local business can grow and pay (more) *taxes*.

At the *operational level*, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), which directs the mission on the ground, should be authorised to analyse the socio-economic effects of the mission and give inputs to the decision-making by the SRSG; this could be done by the team of the Senior Economic Affairs Officer (SEAO). The SEAO, as a point of contact, usually tracks the local and regional economic situation; he/she could analyse
the direct and indirect socio-economic effects of the mission. In case of problematic developments, corrective measures could thus be implemented.

The fundamental idea behind these suggestions is not to create (costly) new structures, but to use existing procedures and functions efficiently. For instance, practically in all armed forces there are officers who are also qualified in economics, like the “contracting officer”. In implementing the proposals, this military personnel could be trained and made aware of these tasks; these persons would then have the capability to advise the local commander. One could look for existing training arrangements in this area in TCCs and make sure that these facilities are properly coordinated to avoid needless duplication.

A final issue is the evaluation and the “lessons-learned” aspect of PKOs with regard to their socio-economic effect. The (short-term) outcomes and the (long-term) impacts of missions have to be the guidelines for assessing PKOs. One element could be the extension of results-based budgeting, also for measuring the achievements of missions concerning its socio-economic effects on the host country.81 Another possibility would be to establish an “evaluation framework” to reveal the complexity of peace operations and measure the different dimensions, also in the socio-economic field.82

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Deutsche Zusammenfassung


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