

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION AND THE 3D APPROACH - MYTH OR REALITY?

The Case of Canada in Kosovo and Afghanistan

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Outline

- **Genesis:** Where did '3D' come from?
 - Wider world
 - Canadian policy
- **Application:** How did it evolve in practice?
 - Kosovo
 - Afghanistan
- **Analysis:** What are the implications?

Genesis




The opening of a newly reconstructed municipal building in Glamoc, Bosnia, rebuilt with assistance from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the UN High Commission for Refugees.

Driven by the Need for Coordinated Responses to Complex Problems

Allied Military Thought

Elements of National Power (DIME)



Three Block War (Krulak 1999)



Operational Art

Small Wars/COIN

'hearts and minds'
'COIN is armed social work'

Political/Development Thought

Common Security (Palme 1982)

Human Security (UNDP 1994)

Integrated Missions (Brahimi 2000)



New Wars / Complex Emergencies (Kaldor / Goodhand 1998/9)

Security Development Nexus

'no development without security; no security without development'

Thought Flowed from Events on the Ground

“The nature of these missions has...substantially changed. They are **more dangerous and complex** than they tended to be during the era of what some call “classical peacekeeping”...For soldiers participating in these new missions, **the task is a lot more complex**...The political and cultural geometry today is radically different.”

Chief of Land Staff (1999)

Canadian Policy Evolved, Too

- Influence of Lloyd Axworthy: version of Human Security (freedom from fear; freedom from want)
- Paul Martin and IPS introduced 3 D; grew to 3 D + C
- New government: One Canada (1C)
- Now 'Whole of Government'

The IPS was Military-centric

“This document represents significant change...first review of Canada’s defence policy in more than 10 years...firmly grounded in the realities of the post-Cold War, post-September 11th world...informed by the rich operational experience of the CF...in Canada and... from Afghanistan to the Balkans to Haiti.”

Intro to IPS/Defence (2005)

...based largely on CDS's Vision


“The CF will continue to participate **across the spectrum** of international operations, with a **focus on the complex and dangerous task** of restoring order to **failed and failing states**. The ability of our military to carry out **three-block war operations** will be critical to the success of Canada's efforts to address the problems of these states.”

IPS/Defence (2005)

Hillier's concept of JIMP

Joint Interagency Multinational Public

Aim: To achieve desired effects



CF operations must be viewed in a JIMP context, where a CF force package operates with multinational and interagency partners to attain unity of purpose and effort in achieving desired effects, all while considering the requirement for public trust and support both domestically and internationally. Public consent will confer legitimacy to the operation.

JIMP = 3D + C

“A force that is joint, interagency, multinational, and public (JIMP) enabled. Such a force would see **diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources**, aligned with those of other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan...applied in areas of operations...”

Cdn Army (2009)

Application



Jason Ransom, PMO

CIMIC as JIMP/3D Ideal

“The [army] personnel who best represent the JIMP capability at present, especially the interagency and public components, are those within the CIMIC specialty.”

Cdn Army (2009)

What is CIMIC for?

“The overarching purpose of [CIMIC] is to **improve the quality of life** for persons in the immediate vicinity of [the Canadian army’s location]. This will have the effect of also **giving a favourable image** of the Coalition...and of **reinforcing the security** of Coalition personnel and assets.”

Cdn Army in Afghanistan (2002)

CIMIC as Focus

“CIMIC has moved **from supporting operations to being operations**...CIMIC and the related activities (reconstruction, governance, development, etc.) are considered influence operations...in terms of impacts upon civil audiences and their leaders, in order to ensure that activities work to support overall objectives.”

Cdn Army (2003)

CIMIC in Kosovo

“As well as performing...peace-support operations, the...contingent carried out **humanitarian aid operations**, such as roofing buildings, reconstructing schools and medical facilities, installing small bridges, and building playgrounds. Under an agreement with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Canadian **contingent received \$750,000** in CIDA funding.”

Op KINETIC: KFOR, Kosovo. 1999-2000

CIMIC Mission Creep?




SAT-A: Strategic Focus and Activities

- *ANDS / PRSP* – The Govt’s strategic plan (economic focus) to meet the *Compact* and the Millennium Development Goals. **Embedded Team**
- MRRD – Main delivery agent. **Embedded Team**
- Office of the President – Reorganize and professionalize. **One member w/ President’s COS**
- Strategic Communications.

Large Military Contribution


FIGURE 2: CANADIAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS (2002 - 2007) Afghanistan



Source: Department of National Defence

Priority for Development Funding

FIGURE 4: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN - BY CHANNEL




Total international assistance over fiscal years 2001-02 to 2006-07: **\$741m**

Source: Canadian International Development Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Department of National Defence

Small Civilian Component

FIGURE 5: GOVERNMENT OF CANADA CIVILIAN DEPLOYMENTS (2002 - 2007)

Afghanistan



Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Manley Report to Review Policy

“In 2005 Canada chose, for whatever reason, to assume leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar City and the security obligations that went with it... has since become a centrepiece of Canada’s engagement. 315...from the CF and the rest [20] from DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP and municipal police, and Correctional Service Canada.”

Manley Report (2008)

Highlighted 3D Approach

“Afghanistan presents an opportunity for Canada. For the first time in many years, we have brought a level of commitment to an international problem that gives us real weight and credibility. For once, our 3Ds (defense, diplomacy and development assistance) are **all pointed at the same problem**, and officials from three departments **are beginning to work together.**”

Foreword, Manley Report (2008)

Stressed Weak Civilian Impact

“The Afghan **insurgency [cannot] be defeated by military force** alone...It is urgent to complete practical, significant development projects...while...contributing to the capacity and legitimacy of...[the] government...Canada’s **civilian programs have not achieved** the scale or depth of engagement necessary to make a significant impact.”

Manley Report (2008)

Pointed to Coordination Issues

“Coordination is currently led by an associate deputy minister of foreign affairs working with reps from DND, DFAIT, CIDA, Correctional Service Canada and the RCMP. CIDA has its own Afghan task force, and some other departments have parallel units responsible for activities in Afghanistan.”

Manley Report (2008)

Need for Ownership

“Separate departmental task forces are not the answer to inadequate coordination of Canadian activities. These coordinating efforts would have stronger effect, and achieve greater cross-government coherence, if they were led by the Prime Minister, supported by a cabinet committee and staffed by a single full-time task force.”

Manley Report (2008)

Recommendations

| Manley Panel Recommendations | Government Action to Date |
|--|---|
| Canada's efforts should be supported by a special cabinet committee on Afghanistan. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan formed in February 2008 |
| There should be a single task force to direct the activities of all departments and agencies. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central Task Force formed in February 2008 |
| Canada should assert a stronger and more disciplined diplomatic position regarding Afghanistan and the regional players. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A more robust diplomatic strategy is being developed ○ Canada is engaging key allies and the newly appointed UN Special Representative ○ Canada's interests have been more forcefully represented at the Bucharest summit and the run-up to the Paris summit |
| Canada should continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond February 2009, with increasing emphasis on training the ANSF. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Government motion on Afghanistan extending Canadian engagement to 2011 passed ○ New priorities emphasize training to allow ANSF to take responsibility for security in Kandahar and nationally ○ An additional battle group has been assigned to Kandahar by NATO |

Recommendations

| Manley Panel Recommendations | Government Action to Date |
|--|--|
| <p>Canada's contribution to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan should be revamped to give higher priority of direct bilateral project assistance addressing immediate and practical needs, especially in Kandahar province.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Programming realignment reflects a higher priority of direct bilateral project assistance that addresses the immediate, practical needs of the Afghan people ○ An enhanced civilian presence will be rolling out over the summer, to include more senior civilian positions in Kabul and Kandahar |
| <p>There should be an assessment of the effectiveness of Canadian contributions and the extent to which the benchmarks and timelines of the Afghanistan Compact have been met.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Cabinet Committee is establishing benchmarks and indicators to measure the practical effects of Canadian policy and changing realities on the ground, and to evaluate Canadian performance |
| <p>The Government should provide the public with franker and more frequent reporting on events in Afghanistan.</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ March 2008 Parliamentary motion passed to ensure greater oversight by the House of Commons ○ Government providing regular technical briefings to the media, including involvement of ministers that sit on the Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan ○ Government committed to providing quarterly reports ○ Benchmarking framework being developed to allow for more regular assessments of success against policy priorities |

Incorporated into New Plan

CANADA'S ENGAGEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN
JUNE 2008

Diplomatic, development and security operations.

- 1. Enable the Afghan National Security Forces...**
- 2. Strengthen Afghan institutional capacity...**
- 3. Provide humanitarian assistance...**
- 4. Enhance border security...**
- 5. Help advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance...**
- 6. Facilitate political reconciliation.**

Analysis



Canadian Forces, MCpl Yves Gemus

Vague idea, not a real policy

“The 3-Ds were not backed up with a clear definition of the term, especially in the context of the new conflict zone Canada was entering. No unitary objective was established and no division of functions between the 3-Ds to achieve the objective was envisaged.”

Nipa Banerjee, former CIDA Rep (2009)

Not all Ds are equal

“There is a Three D policy and the military does all three of the Ds.”

CDS General Hillier

If everyone can, anyone can

“Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan have “a sophisticated set of skills and instruments, including combat capabilities, negotiation and diplomatic skills, and a willingness to help others rebuild their institutions in a way that is culturally sensitive to their distinct local needs.”

Minister of National Defence (2005)

All for one, or one for all?

“There will be many...players, inside and outside Canada’s ‘whole of government’ approach, whose agendas **may not necessarily coincide** with that of the military.”


Cdn Army 2009

3D was never fully accepted



Canadian International Development Agency

Agence canadienne de développement international



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Canada's International Policy Statement (2005)

Please note that this document was never officially adopted by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It is available for reference only.

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[A World in Transition](#)

[Development Status: Progress and Challenge](#)

[Addressing the Development Challenge](#)

[The Way Forward](#)

[A Whole-of-government Approach to Development](#)

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3 D as justification

“This strategic airlift capability is great news for...Canada....provide[s]... an unprecedented level of responsiveness, independence and strategic agility. ***Among many other things***, strategic airlift will enhance...ability to **project humanitarian assistance.**”

CF announcement of \$8.3 bn C-17 purchase (2007)

Ad hoc or ad lib?

“Notwithstanding attempts to practice an integrated, more “whole of government” approach to operations, recent **efforts have largely been ad hoc** in nature. As such there is a need to develop clear and accepted institutions, practices and procedures to more fully facilitate the goal.”



Cdn Army (2009)

Who coordinates whom?

“A robust CIMIC capability is required to ensure that the **intentions and actions of civil actors are coordinated** with military intentions.”

Cdn Army 2009

Divided or integrated?



Does it work?

“We mouth the correct words on CIMIC and how we will use to win...but we do not emphasize it...people revert to what they were earliest taught...kinetic operations to destroy an enemy physically...we are fighting...without coming up with a realistic, coherent, and holistic approach...Instead we will continue to kill a lot of people [and] be tolerated by the locals while we outgun them.”

Cdn Army Officer, part of PRT 2005-2006

A desire for clarity?

“which derives in part from a Cartesian dislike of the clutter of muddling through...There is a reassuring, though, often illusory, sense of order, and of control, that can result from being able to conceptualize disparate and eclectic phenomena as parts of an integrated whole, especially if this can be then subjected to analysis and evaluation from first principles and basic priorities.”

Prof. Denis Stairs (2003)

Questions?

