

Executive Summary

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Turkey after the elections – what now?

Online Panel Discussion in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence

This analysis builds on the insights gained from an online discussion which took place on May 17, 2022, and was organized by the Austrian Institute for International Affairs - oiip. Sebnem Gümüşcü, Berk Esen, Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Cengiz Günay analysed the elections, why and how Erdoğan and the AKP could prevail, the failures of the opposition, Erdoğan's future and his foreign policy options including relations with the EU, NATO, and Russia.

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The presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023 in Turkey were historical. For the first time in more than 20 years under the rule of the Justice and Development Party and its chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a victory of the opposition seemed to be within reach. The impact of the disastrous earthquake of February 6, 2023, and a terrible economic crisis with soaring inflation and a collapsing Turkish Lira posed serious challenges to President Erdoğan and his party. Various polls predicted the victory of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu the joint presidential candidate of the opposition. However, election results revealed that polls and most observers had underestimated the capabilities of the regime to mobilise the masses. President Erdoğan was forced into a second round which can be seen as a significant success for the opposition, but more than Kılıçdaroğlu this was owed to Sinan Oğan, the third presidential candidate who to the surprise of many observers won more than 5 percent. In the second round President Erdoğan secured with 52.18 percent a third term. His challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu achieved with 47.82 percent a respectable result, but it was not enough to bring about regime change (NTV Secim 2023).

Parliamentary elections which were held simultaneously with the first round of the presidential elections on May 14, led to a further shift to the right. Although the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost around 10 percent together with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) the so-called People's Alliance dominates 49.5 percent of parliament. A couple of ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative parties such as Yeniden Refah or HÜDA-PAR entered parliament as part of the People's Alliance.

Presidential and parliamentary elections confirmed the resilience of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the system he and his party (AKP- Justice and Development Party) established over the last 20 years, but it also highlighted that in a competitive authoritarian regime as Turkey, a united opposition can seriously challenge the regime.

Now the question is whether President Erdoğan's third and most probably last term will be characterized by a certain degree of liberalization or further autocratization.

Key takeaways:

- There is a deep gap between urban metropolitan areas and the emergent provincial towns in the assessment of the state of the country and its future.
- The economic crisis is not felt the same way across the country - the middle class in larger cities is more affected than people in provincial towns and in the countryside.
- Most observers have focused on the authoritarian character of the regime and have underestimated its mobilisation capacities.
- Party structures, organisation and presence at the grassroots matter
- Identity politics / narratives can supersede economic issues.
- In times of crisis many voters do not strive for political change. Allegiance and loyalty to Erdoğan was - despite the economic crisis - a crucial motivation of his electorate.
- Kılıçdaroğlu successfully build a broad alliance, but his campaign lacked a clear program and a vision for the future.
- Kılıçdaroğlu and the CHP (Republican People's Party) opened their ranks for former AKP politicians, but this strategy did not help mobilising parts of the AKP electorate.
- Although Erdoğan's AKP is losing popularity, Erdoğan he is not.
- The continued need for support from his coalition partner, the MHP, puts the AKP in a difficult position as the MHP gains more and more institutional power.
- It is unlikely that Erdoğan will revise the presidential system or fully autocratise the Turkish political landscape. After all, the political competition legitimises his power.
- Despite some bilateral progress, Turkey's relationship with the EU is unlikely to change in Erdoğan's third term as president.
- Turkey does not have an alternative to NATO membership and close relations with the US and the EU, however it will continue to balance this tight relationship out with other actors such as Russia, China, Qatar, and others.

Deutsche Fassung:

Die Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen im Mai 2023 in der Türkei galten als historisch. Zum ersten Mal seit in den mehr als 20 Jahren unter der Herrschaft der Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (AKP) und ihres Vorsitzenden Recep Tayyip Erdoğan schien ein Sieg der Opposition in Reichweite. Die Auswirkungen des verheerenden Erdbebens vom 6. Februar 2023 und eine schreckliche Wirtschaftskrise mit steigender Inflation und einem Zusammenbruch der türkischen Lira stellten Präsident Erdoğan und seine Partei vor große Herausforderungen. Verschiedene Umfragen sagten den Sieg von Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, dem gemeinsamen Präsidentschaftskandidaten der Opposition, voraus. Die Wahlergebnisse zeigten jedoch, dass die Umfragen und die meisten Beobachter die Fähigkeit des Regimes, die Massen zu mobilisieren, unterschätzt hatten. Präsident Erdoğan wurde in eine zweite Runde gezwungen, was als bedeutender Erfolg für die Opposition gewertet werden kann, aber mehr als Kılıçdaroğlu war dies Sinan Oğan zu verdanken, dem dritten Präsidentschaftskandidaten, der zur Überraschung vieler Beobachter mehr als 5 Prozent der Stimmen erhielt. Im zweiten Wahlgang sicherte sich Präsident Erdoğan mit 52,18 Prozent eine dritte Amtszeit. Sein Herausforderer Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu erzielte mit 47,82 Prozent ein respektables Ergebnis, das jedoch nicht ausreichte, um einen Regimewechsel herbeizuführen (NTV Secim 2023).

Die Parlamentswahlen, die gleichzeitig mit der ersten Runde der Präsidentschaftswahlen am 14. Mai stattfanden, führten zu einem weiteren Rechtsruck. Obwohl die regierende Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (AKP) zusammen mit der ultranationalistischen Partei der Nationalistischen Bewegung (MHP) rund 10 Prozent verloren hat, dominiert die so genannte Volksallianz 49,5 Prozent des Parlaments. Eine Reihe ultranationalistischer und ultrakonservativer Parteien wie Yeniden Refah oder HüdaPar zogen als Teil der Volksallianz ins Parlament ein.

Die Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen bestätigten die Widerstandsfähigkeit von Recep Tayyip Erdoğan und des Systems, das er und seine Partei (AKP - Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung) in den letzten 20 Jahren aufgebaut haben, machten aber auch deutlich, dass in einem wettbewerbsorientierten autoritären Regime wie der Türkei eine vereinte Opposition das Regime ernsthaft herausfordern kann.

Nun stellt sich die Frage, ob die dritte und wahrscheinlich letzte Amtszeit von Präsident Erdoğan durch ein gewisses Maß an Liberalisierung oder weitere Autokratisierung gekennzeichnet sein wird.

Die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse:

- Zwischen den städtischen Ballungsgebieten und den aufstrebenden Provinzstädten klafft eine tiefe Kluft hinsichtlich der Einschätzung des Zustands des Landes und seiner Zukunft.
- Die Wirtschaftskrise wird nicht im ganzen Land in gleicher Weise gespürt - die Mittelschicht in den größeren Städten ist stärker betroffen als die Menschen in den Provinzstädten und auf dem Land.
- Die meisten Beobachter:innen haben sich auf den autoritären Charakter des Regimes konzentriert und dessen Mobilisierungskapazitäten unterschätzt.
- Parteistrukturen, Organisation und Präsenz an der Basis spielen eine wesentliche Rolle.
- Identitätspolitik / Narrative können wirtschaftliche Fragen verdrängen.
- In Zeiten der Krise streben viele Wähler keinen politischen Wandel an. Die Treue und Loyalität zu Erdoğan war - trotz der Wirtschaftskrise - ein entscheidendes Motiv seiner Wählerschaft.
- Kılıçdaroğlu gelang es, ein breites Bündnis aufzubauen, doch fehlte es seiner Kampagne an einem klaren Programm und einer Vision für die Zukunft.
- Kılıçdaroğlu und die CHP (Republikanische Volkspartei) öffneten ihre Reihen für ehemalige AKP-Politiker:innen, aber diese Strategie trug nicht zur Mobilisierung von Teilen der AKP-Wählerschaft bei.
- Auch wenn Erdoğans AKP an Popularität verliert, Erdoğan selbst ist weiterhin populär.
- Da er weiterhin auf die Unterstützung seines Koalitionspartners, der MHP, angewiesen ist, befindet sich die AKP in einer schwierigen Lage, da die MHP immer mehr institutionelle Macht erlangt.
- Es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass Erdoğan das Präsidialsystem revidieren oder die politische Landschaft der Türkei vollständig autokratisieren wird. Immerhin legitimiert der politische Wettbewerb seine Macht.
- Trotz einiger bilateraler Fortschritte werden sich die Beziehungen der Türkei zur EU in Erdoğans dritter Amtszeit wohl kaum grundlegend ändern.
- Die Türkei hat keine Alternative zur NATO-Mitgliedschaft und zu den engen Beziehungen zu den USA und der EU, wird diese engen Beziehungen aber weiterhin mit anderen Akteuren wie Russland, China, Katar und anderen ausgleichen.

The background

In the 20 years of rule under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey has experienced gradual autocratization approved by large electoral majorities. Autocratization has entailed gradual state capture, the control of the judiciary, the construction of a pro-government media and business bloc, the securitization of political protest, and the curtailment of democratic liberties. However, despite an authoritarian logic of governing, the Turkish system is characterized by affective polarization and fierce political competition. While elections have been an important source of legitimacy, polarization has helped President Erdoğan and the ruling party mobilize and unite the ranks. The same has been the case for the opposition. Turkish elections have been free of large-scale manipulations, but they have taken place in an uneven playing field. The ruling party and President Erdoğan have exploited state resources excessively. The opposition and its joint presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu from the Republican People's Party (CHP) have only had limited access to mainstream media. Many representatives of the opposition were harassed, rallies faced obstacles and cadres of the pro-Kurdish HDP (Peoples' Democracy Party) were arrested in the run-up to the elections.

Presidential and parliamentary elections of May 2023 took place under the effect of soaring inflation rates, rising unemployment and in the wake of the terrible earthquake of February 6, 2023. While the opposition tried to present the elections as a historic choice between democracy and authoritarianism, the ruling bloc and President Erdoğan proclaimed the elections as the starting point for a "Turkey century" (*Türkiye yüzyılı*).

The presidential system introduced in 2018 has shifted the focus to the presidential elections. The candidate who wins more than 50 percent wins. If no candidate passes the 50 percent threshold the two candidates with the highest share in votes compete in a second round. Three candidates, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and Sinan Oğan entered the first round. The new system has supported the formation of electoral alliances.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) formed together with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the nationalist Great Union Party (BBP), and the Islamist Yeniden Refah Partisi the so-called People's Alliance. Moreover the AKP placed members of the ultra-conservative Kurdish HÜDA-PAR and the leftist DSP on its party list. The major opposition party CHP (Republican People's Party) formed together with the moderate-nationalist İYİ Parti, the Islamist Saadet Partisi, the

center right Demokrat Parti, DEVA Party and Gelecek Partisi the Nation Alliance¹.

The pro-Kurdish HDP formed together with the Turkish Labor Party (TIP) the Freedom and Labor Alliance. Kılıçdaroğlu was also supported by the Nation Alliance and the Freedom and Labor Alliance. A unified opposition against Erdoğan seemed to make a victory of Kılıçdaroğlu within reach.

Although, many polls proclaimed Erdoğan's defeat, he missed the necessary 50 percent threshold by only 0.48 percent. Kılıçdaroğlu only gained 44.88 percent of the votes. The results of the first round of the elections on May 14, 2023 came as a surprise to most supporters of the opposition and most of national and international observers. As much as Kılıçdaroğlu's chances were overestimated, Sinan Oğan was underestimated. Oğan was able to win without any party structure and noteworthy campaign 5.17 percent (2.830.208 votes).

In the second round Kılıçdaroğlu set out to win over the Oğan voters. Nationalism and anti-migrant rhetoric replaced the consiliatory tone of his previous campaign. Oğan himself endorsed President Erdoğan. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won the second round on May 28 with 52.18 percent while his challenger remained at 47.82 percent.

Parliamentary elections led to a further shift to the right. The People's Alliance around the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) dominate with 49.5 percent the National Assembly. However, conservatives and nationalists also entered parliament on the list of the Nation Alliance. The new parliament is the most conservative and most nationalist in Turkish history.

The candidate and the grassroots matter

Ultimately, Erdoğan's competitive political machinery and the unwavering commitment of his supporters played a key role in his victory. His considerable financial, organisational and propaganda power should not be underestimated, especially as the traditional media have a tangible impact on more than half of the Turkish population. Berk Esen highlighted in the online debate that; We should be less surprised that Erdoğan won, but rather that the opposition was so successful despite a weak candidate and a weak campaign."

¹ DEVA was founded by Ali Babacan who served between 2002 -2015 under Erdoğan as foreign minister and the minister of economy. Gelecek Partisi was founded by Ahmet Davutoğlu who served as foreign minister, prime minister and even led the AKP between 2014-2016. Kılıçdaroğlu's calculus was that the two former AKP politicians would lure voters away from the AKP.

Although Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign was not necessarily wrong, he as a candidate might have been. Kılıçdaroğlu is not a new, untainted political figure. He has been leading the main opposition party for more than 13 years. Over the years, Erdoğan and the pro-government media bloc have successfully built among the AKP electorate a negative image of Kılıçdaroğlu. Despite a positive campaign, this image was too difficult to break, also considering the limited access to mainstream media. Esen emphasised that just as much as there is an anti-Erdoğan sentiment, there is also an anti-Kılıçdaroğlu sentiment among large parts of the electorate. While Kılıçdaroğlu is considered to be uncharismatic, the mayors of Istanbul; Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş have been the most popular politicians of the CHP.

Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign over relied on social media and largely neglected contact the grassroots. Most of the smaller partners of the Nation Alliance do hardly have any organisational structures in the provinces and could hardly mobilise. Also İYİ party - the second largest partner of the Nation Alliance - has hardly established organizational structures across the country. Moreover, many İYİ Parti functionaries and supporters were not enthusiastic about Kılıçdaroğlu's candidacy and the support he received from the pro-Kurdish HDP. The CHP in turn, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, is the oldest political organisation of Republican Turkey. However, as the former state-party, the CHP could never successfully develop grassroots organisations across the country. Many functionaries are former bureaucrats, members of the upper middle-class and the intelligentsia with little contact with the new urban middle class or the working class. The party organisation is weak in many regions, including working class areas in metropolitan areas and many functionaries do not have experience with street- and grassroots work.

Identity politics beat economy

Turkish election results proved the assumption that an economic crisis leads to change in government wrong. Senem Aydın-Düzgit emphasised in the online discussion that inflation and the soaring housing prices aren't felt equally but varied across the country. The members of the middle class in larger cities have been stronger affected than people in the Anatolian provinces. Moreover, the government's measures such as the increase in pension rates seem to have plagued the anger of many supporters. Moreover, the Turkish elections have proven that in times of crisis voters do hardly favour change in government. Aydın-Düzgit and Gümüşcü analysed that many AKP voters highlighted that it would have been wrong to abandon their leader in times of crisis, even if they are dissatisfied with some policies. After all, in the eyes of many of his voters Erdoğan has delivered in the past. He improved conditions in the health sector and infrastructure, he strengthened Turkey's international standing and many

conservative voters feel they owe their freedom and economic status to Erdoğan. The large pro-government media bloc replicated these messages and called for loyalty to the leader.

The Erdoğan campaign emphasised identity issues and could successfully distract from high inflation rates and the collapse of the Turkish Lira. The President and his party used the pro-Kurdish HDP's support for Kılıçdaroğlu to discredit him. Erdoğan's campaign accused the HDP of being the political arm of the PKK and depicted Kılıçdaroğlu as the candidate at the PKK's mercy. Erdoğan's campaign even used at party meetings deep fake videos showing PKK militias and leaders dancing to Kılıçdaroğlu's campaign song. Whereas liberal observers dismissed these statements as absurd, it seems that they have well resonated with the conservative nationalist electorate that has already been sceptical of Kılıçdaroğlu. Similarly, while liberal commentators celebrated Kılıçdaroğlu's affirmation of his Alevi identity² it seems it was not helpful in winning over conservative Sunni Muslim votes. Hence, considering the emphasis on identity issues, Kılıçdaroğlu was the wrong candidate for the strategy of his campaign which built on reaching out to conservative constituencies.

Erdoğan has successfully presented himself as the personification of the state. Thus, criticism of the crisis management after the earthquake was dismissed by the government as the challenging of state power as such. The "state" as the provider of security and stability for the community has traditionally been a strong theme among conservative and Turkish nationalist voters whereas leftists (Kurdish and Turkish) and liberals have traditionally questioned the notion of a strong, authoritarian state. Senem Aydın Düzgit emphasised that this element has been exploited by the regime's campaign.

This problem was also evident in the run-up to the head-to-head elections. The opposition faced the challenge of striking the balance between winning over undecided secular Turkish nationalists who had voted in the first round for Sinan Oğan and maintaining the support of Kurdish voters. Convincing these undecided voters without alienating Kurdish support proved to be a difficult task for Kılıçdaroğlu. In the run up to the second round, the opposition abandoned its conciliatory strategy and shifted to a more confrontative tone. Kılıçdaroğlu also attacked the person of President Erdoğan directly and initiated a radical anti-migration discourse. He promised to send Syrian refugees back. Kılıçdaroğlu hoped that the anti-migration discourse would help bridge the different ideological camps. However, he ultimately failed, to mobilise ultra-nationalist and conservative voters dissatisfied with the AKP and keep the Kurdish voters mobilised. Turnout in the second round was lower. Dissatisfied conservative

² Alevi's are a marginalised minority whose members are often seen by conservative Sunni Muslims as heretics.

and Turkish nationalist voters as well as many Kurdish constituencies in the country's eastern provinces rather abstained in the second round than voting for Kılıçdaroğlu.

The opposition after the elections

After defeat the opposition is in pieces. Despite growing criticism, Kılıçdaroğlu has declined to resign. He rather declared to lead Turkey into democracy at any cost. Within the CHP there is a growing rift between the party leadership around Kılıçdaroğlu and those who support Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul and the party's most charismatic and most popular politician. Kılıçdaroğlu's strategy to place DEVA and Gelecek Partisi candidates on CHP lists have reduced CHP seats in parliament. Also İYİ Party leader Meral Akşener faced inner party criticism for her support for Kılıçdaroğlu. Rifts within the Nation Alliance have deepened. These are bleak prospects for the local elections to be held in the in the first half of 2024 has already started. Erdoğan's goal is to win back the major cities at any cost - even if this entails the de-legitimation or ban of mayors and candidates of the opposition. The opposition in turn can only win if it manages to stay united.

Erdoğan's third (and last?) presidential term

President Erdoğan secured a third term, but he is weakened. In the parliamentary elections, the ruling AKP lost around 10 percent of votes. Most of these votes did not go to the opposition but went to other partners within the People's Alliance such as the ultra-nationalist MHP. President Erdoğan has become increasingly dependent on the alliance with the MHP. According to Senem Aydın Düzgit Erdoğan is indebted to his political partner. The nationalists have developed over the last years considerable influence within the state institutions and the bureaucracy. The strong influence of the ultra-nationalists makes a change in the Kurdish issue less likely.

President Erdoğan renewed his cabinet after the elections. Except for two ministers all other ministers, including minister of the interior Süleyman Soylu - a hawk - were replaced. The appointment of Mehmet Şimşek as minister of economy and Hafize Gaye Erkan, an American-Turkish banker as first woman to head the Central Bank were clear signals of a return to orthodox monetary policies and aimed at reassuring the markets.

Despite adaptations in economic and monetary policies, the third term will allow for the consolidation of the presidential system. A return to a parliamentarian system seems more difficult after another five years. There are also reasonable fears of a further slide into authoritarianism. Although this is a

realistic scenario, Sebnem Gümüſcü believes that it is unlikely that Erdoğan will make significant changes to the existing competitive authoritarian regime. Erdoğan's entire political trajectory has shown a strong emphasis on elections. He believes in electoral competition and finds validation in winning elections. Electoral majorities are his most important source of legitimacy. As long as he retains popular support, there is no compelling motive for Erdoğan to limit or annul elections. Instead he would rather further shift conditions under which elections are taking place to his favour such as reviewing and revising the system – e.g., by lowering the electoral threshold. In any case, maintaining a sense of legitimacy remains a crucial factor for the regime, as this also encourages other leaders to recognise the election outcome.

Erdoğan declared that the third would also his last term. This opens the question of succession. For the time being there are no personalities. However, the appointment of Hakan Fidan (former chief of the secret service MIT) as foreign minister and the appointment of his spokesman Ibrahim Kalın as MIT chief were interpreted as rotations which might be connected to personnel restructuring in view of succession.

Turkey's future foreign policy

Over the last years, there has been a growing gap in the security needs and risk perceptions between Turkey and its NATO partners. This has led Turkey to pursue a more autonomous security policy. Also, relations with the EU have been increasingly difficult. Both sides have more than once used Turkey's accession as a tool for populist mobilisation around identity issues. This has made the solving of burning issues like visa liberalisation or the reform of the Customs Union difficult. Nevertheless, the EU has remained Turkey's most important trading partner. The Turkish government will continue to pursue a multivectoral foreign policy which aims to balance out Turkey's foreign policy options. Relations with the EU and the United States are expected to continue to be transactional and pragmatic.

Alienation from the US and other NATO allies led to more intensified relations with Russia in the area of economy and security. The true dimension of the cooperation is unknown. Arrangements, promises, and concessions are made behind closed doors. There is a lack of transparency in Erdoğan's relations with President Putin. However, shortly after the elections, President Erdoğan has begun balancing out growing Russian influence with a rapprochement with the West. Erdoğan welcomed Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in Turkey, publicly supported Ukraine's membership to NATO, and allowed for the

return of five Ukrainian commanders to their homes³. Finally, he approved Sweden's NATO membership at the NATO summit in Vilnius.

Erdoğan used reservations against Sweden's membership to negotiate Sweden's support for Kurdish militias and the government's liberal attitude towards PKK structures, but even more so to highlight Turkey's weight in the alliance. For a long time, Turkey has felt misunderstood, ignored, and marginalised. Other countries often gather unofficially without involving Turkey.

Although, Turkey has sought reduce dependency on Western financing institutions by improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the EU continues to be Turkey's most important trading partner. Düzgit points out that Turkey is not like Venezuela which owns natural resources such as reserves. Turkey is strongly interconnected with European markets and highly dependent on imports and exports. The EU has hardly used its economic power to pressure Turkey - also because of its dependency on Turkey's cooperation in migration management, it could use its leverage in case of severe human rights violations or a shift to outright autocratisation.

Conclusions

Turkish elections highlighted the competitive aspect of the Erdoğan regime. Despite ongoing economic challenges, President Erdoğan could mobilise voters around identity issues. While initially adopting a positive and unifying strategy the opposition has struggled to change voter opinion and create a unified vision for change. Erdoğan's victory relied heavily on the nationalist alliance with the MHP, raising concerns about a potential shift towards a more restrictive and autocratic regime. However, Erdoğan's focus on electoral competition and the need for legitimacy among his supporters make a complete abandonment of the competitive element unlikely. Turkey has already entered into the next election modus. Local elections will be held in spring 2024. President Erdoğan and his party aim to win back the large metropolitan areas. The third term of President Erdoğan will be also increasingly defined by the question of succession.

On the foreign policy front, Turkey's relations with the EU are likely to remain strained but stable. The balance between Western and non-Western allies will be crucial for Turkey's global position, but the extent to which Western countries are willing to compromise their economic interests remains uncertain. Overall, one can expect the continuity of a foreign policy that is mainly driven by the aim to maximise Turkey's and the regime's options. Given these circumstances, and the increasing

³ These officers were swapped with Russian soldiers in a deal brokered by Turkey. Turkey had then guaranteed Russia that they would remain in Turkey until the end of the war (Foggiano 2023).

centralisation observed in other policy areas, it seems unlikely that Turkey will regain the trust of its Western allies within NATO if the government continues with its current foreign policy line.

Sources

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