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A Tug-of-War that Risks Snapping the Rope: Regional Competition over Post-Assad Syria

Policy Analysis 6 / 2025
By Cengiz Günay, Josefine Paulsen, Yuki Adachi

Executive Summary

The sudden fall of the Assad regime occurred amid widespread political and economic crises, regionally and internationally. The prospects for international cooperation on reconstruction — let alone democratization — remain slim. Regional powers pursue ambitious goals but are weakened by domestic challenges and economic stagnation. While most actors agree on preserving the Syrian nation-state, their approach to the interim government under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) diverge significantly. In this fragile context, there is an imminent risk of re-escalation, and snapping the rope. This Policy Paper analyzes the competing geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean in the context of Syria’s regime change.

• Turkey, the former protector of the victorious HTS rebel group, holds strong cards in the geopolitical game for regional dominance. However, HTS is not Ankara’s proxy, and Turkey is currently lacking the economic and political capacity to decisively shape Syria’s future.
• The Gulf monarchies are all focused on domestic political, social and economic transitions. Nevertheless, they are the only regional powers with the economic power to invest in Syria’s future. However, Saudi Arabia is ideologically wary of HTS, and no actor is eager to fund Turkey’s regional ambitions.
• Israel seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial unity, yet keep HTS as weak as possible and prevent the rise of extremist Islamist groups. The tug-of-war between Israel and Turkey is one of the most immanent risks of snapping the rope in Syria.
• Iran and Russia: While Assad’s fall represents a major setback for both actors, both countries have built complex informal networks across Syria. They are now focused on maintaining influence over these networks below the surface.
• The United States and the EU are barely involved in shaping post-Assad Syria. It seems unlikely that these two actors get actively involved in Syria in the near future.

Keywords: Geopolitics, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, Syria, Turkey, Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Iran, Russia

Introduction 

In December 2024 the bloody 13-year civil war in Syria took a sudden turn; In a swift offensive, an alliance of the rebel groups led by the Islamist Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) advanced southwards from Idlib. In just two weeks, they seized control of several major cities, including Aleppo, Hama and Homs, reaching Damascus on December 8. President Bashar al-Assad and his family hastily left the country for Russia, marking the end of five decades of Baathist rule (Gowayed et al 2024).

Regime change in Syria occurs amid widespread geopolitical shifts. The United States have largely disengaged from the region and from democracy promotion at large; the Europeans are preoccupied with containing Russia, Russia in turn is weakened by its war in Ukraine, and China has yet to assume an active global role. Meanwhile, regional actors such as Turkey, the Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, as well as Israel and Iran, are deeply invested in shaping Syria’s future. However, their objectives and strategies often diverge, and none of them individually has the capacity to shape the outcome effectively. Most of them are constrained by domestic political and economic crises. In Syria, HTS has consolidated its power, but it has failed to establish control over the entire Syrian territory. The country’s infrastructure and economy are left in ruins; several million Syrians are either internally displaced or have fled the country. A large number of weapons remain in circulation. Under these conditions, the risk of renewed conflict in Syria remains high.

This Policy Paper examines the geopolitical implications of the collapse of the Assad regime. The sudden change has disrupted long-standing power dynamics and created space for new and diverse actors to assert influence. In the short term, Syria’s stabilization is threatened by a complex web of conflicting regional and international interests. Crucially, no single regional power possesses the capacity to dominate the post-Assad landscape, fostering fragmentation and heightening the risk of renewed conflict.

Syria after the fall of the Assad-Regime

The swift collapse of the al-Assad regime underscores how severely Syria’s governing and security structures have eroded over years of civil war, corruption, foreign dependency and systemic decay. Despite nominal battlefield successes in cities like Homs, Hama, and Aleppo after 2015, these gains were not the result of regime strength but of external intervention—primarily Russian airpower and Hezbollah’s ground support. Assad’s military remained critically weakened: poorly equipped, underpaid, and plagued by low morale. These internal vulnerabilities became decisive when faced with the disciplined forces of HTS. The regime’s military and security institutions crumbled rapidly, and, in many areas, it collapsed without notable resistance (Hof 2024; Ziadeh 2024).

Assad left behind a country in ruins. The conflict claimed more than 407.000 lives between 2011 and 2022 (The World Bank 2024). More than 6 million Syrians fled the country, and approximately 7.4 million are internally displaced. While 70 per cent of the population is dependent on humanitarian aid, 90 per cent live below the poverty line (UNHCR 2025). The war has destroyed basic infrastructure; Syrians suffer from energy shortages, destroyed roads and transportation and a poor health- and education system. The devastating earthquakes of 2023 further exacerbated this precarious situation, destroying hundreds of thousands of housing units and leaving approximately 500.000 to 600.000 people homeless (The World Bank 2024).

Over 13 years of war, Syria’s economic output had collapsed—GDP had contracted by 54 per cent, and overall production declined by 80 percent (World Bank 2024). Inflation had surged by 115 per cent in 2023, and foreign trade had largely disintegrated as a result of the protracted conflict and international sanctions. Industrial activity came to a near standstill, while agricultural output was severely reduced due to both war and recurring droughts. Furthermore, Syria had become increasingly dependent on imports, many of which were controlled by informal, mafia-like networks involving the military, security services, and members of the Assad family. The production and regional trafficking of the illegal drug Captagon had become one of the regime’s key sources of revenue, further embedding corruption and criminality within state structures (Die Presse 2025). These conditions progressively eroded what remained of public support for the regime.

The HTS-led offensive was strategically timed. Assad’s regime, heavily reliant on Russian and Iranian support, was left vulnerable as both allies were weakened – Russia by its war in Ukraine and Iran by Israel’s targeted attacks on its military facilities and Hezbollah, Teheran’s proxy in Lebanon (Hoffman 2024). With foreign backing diminished, the regime was unable to defend itself.

In the wake of Assad’s fall, HTS has formed an interim government under Ahmed al-Sharaa. The organization, an offshoot of Jabhat al-Nusra, which in turn emerged from al-Qaida in Syria, has since dominated the post-Assad transition process. Despite its Islamist ideological background, the group has adopted a pragmatic approach to politics[1]. HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, was announced president for the transitional period in January 2025. The interim president has since formed a transitional legislative council. Al-Sharaa has outlined a transitional period of five years, and in March 2025, the interim government announced an interim (provisional) constitution (Al Jazeera 2025).

HTS has consolidated its control over the state apparatus and the institutions. However, HTS faces a dual challenge: first transforming from a militant group into a political organization, and secondly developing functioning nationwide power structures and political alliances. This transition is critical for gaining legitimacy and broadening support across the country. Although there is still broad support for the interim government, there is also growing criticism about HTS’s monopolization of power. Various Syrian oppositional groups have complained about a lack of inclusiveness in the transition period.

HTS’s main goal has been to gain control over the entire Syrian territory, unite the country, and to disarm and integrate militias into the Syrian army.

A unified Syria has been in the interest of most international and regional actors. A deal was signed in March 2025 between the interim government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), facilitated by the US military in Syria. US military representatives forced its ally in the war against ISIS to the table and to negotiate with the interim government (Lister 2025). The deal recognizes the Kurdish community as an integral part of the state, and lays the groundwork for integrating Kurdish militias and administrative structures into national institutions. The US also pushed other partners of the counter-ISIS coalition, such as the Free Syrian Army, to join the Syrian Ministry of Defense. This strengthens the interim government’s capabilities to fight against ISIS on the one hand, and on the other allows the United States to have partner forces within the interim government (Lister 2025)

The “revenge killings” of 800-1000 members of the Alawite community in the Western coastal province of Latakia in March 2025 highlights the fragile security situation after Assad’s ousting (Clarke-Billings & Pomeroy 2025; Alboz & Bain2025).

The fragile security situation has been further exacerbated by economic misery. The Atlantic Council estimates the cost of reconstruction in Syria be between $250 billion and $400 billion USD (Hatahet 2025). Doubts about al-Shaara’s and HTS' legitimacy and intentions due to their former ties with al Qaida further complicates the prospects of mobilization for Syria’s reconstruction. Moreover, shifting from an informal war economy heavily reliant on smuggling and criminal networks, to a formal state economy, will require monumental effort and substantial resources.

The lifting of EU and US sanctions would be an important step, but it will not suffice to rebuild and stabilize Syria. The US has made the lifting of sanctions conditional on removing foreign jihadists fighters from the Syrian army and destroying chemical weapons (Zvi Bar’el 2025).

Tug-of-War over a Fraying Rope

The Eastern Mediterranean region has been in turmoil for quite some time. Syria, situated at the crossroads between Turkey and the Levante, and the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf, is pivotal for the peace and security of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

The bloody Syrian civil war has been a quilt work of regional and foreign state- and non-state actors. While Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah and Russian air force directly interfered on the side of the regime, Turkey, the Gulf countries and Israel were engaged in covert warfare against the regime. The Turkish government offered refuge to opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and provided training and technical equipment for Islamist fighters in Syria. From 2015 on, Turkey created a buffer zone on Syrian territory,  with the help of proxies such as the Syrian National Army (SNA). Saudi Arabia funded rivalling Islamist Sunni groups within Syria, mainly to counterwork Iran’s increasing influence. With the emergence of ISIS, the US, the UAE, Jordan and others became increasingly involved in airstrikes and special operations in Syria. Israeli operations mainly targeted Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria. Israel’s involvement in Syria intensified after October 7 2023. Israel’s targeted attacks on Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria has had serious impact on Iranian’s regional power projection capability. This certainly facilitated the rapid fall of the Assad regime.

The heavy involvement of global and regional actors in Syria has not disappeared with the fall of the Assad-regime. Informal networks, relations and dependencies between Syrian groups, militias and institutions will shape Syria’s future. The situation is further complicated by the presence of Turkish troops in the north of Syria, the invasion of southern areas by Israeli troops, the deployment of approximately 2000 US soldiers across smaller bases in the northeast and on the al-Tanf border crossing to Iraq (Reuters 2025d; Crisis Group 2025, AlJazeera 2024), as well as Russian military bases on the Western coast (Sliwa 2021).

While global and regional actors largely agree on safeguarding Syria’s territorial unity, their visions for the future Syria diverge. At the same time, they all lack the necessary political and/or economic capabilities to follow through with their ambitions. Looming succession crises, political polarization, economic issues and societal transitions dominate domestic politics in all regional states, leaving them with less constructive strategies in their approach to Syria.

The following part outlines the interests of the most relevant regional actors and the status their involvements in Syria.

Turkey holds Pole Position but lacks Strength

Turkey is widely regarded as the key beneficiary of HTS’s victory and the Assad regime’s collapse. President Trump has even gone as far as to state that "He (Erdoğan) took over Syria" (Berman 2025).

In any case, Turkey has moved closer to realizing its strategic objectives: removing the Assad-regime, preserving Syria’s territorial unity under a friendly leadership and preventing the establishment of a Kurdish entity in northern Syria dominated by the PYD, which Ankara sees as an extension of the PKK. Ankara has never controlled HTS, but has developed strong military-, intelligence- and political communication channels with the rebel organization. As a pragmatic, but ideologically conservative-Sunni organization, the Turkish AKP government sees HTS as a natural ally who pursues policies to Ankara’s liking (Tol 2024). The Turkish government pursued a partisan foreign policy in favour of moderate Islamist groups and parties after the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and the Qaddafi regime in Libya. In all these cases, Turkey’s ruling AKP tried to position itself as a model for emergent Islamist governance in the region.

Since the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamist Ennahda party in Tunisia were both removed from power, Ankara now seeks to leverage its supremacy in Syria to reclaim status as a regional power.

Turkish authorities therefore rushed to Damascus after Assad’s ousting. High ranking visits aimed at endorsing HTS, reassuring Ankara’s aspirations of special relations with the new Syria, and send out a strong message to other regional aspirants.

The first high-ranking visitor from Turkey was Ibrahim Kalın, head of Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) and confidant of President Erdoğan. Kalın visited Damascus only four days after Assad’s departure, on December 12, 2024. Allegedly, Kalın was accompanied by Khalfan al-Kaabi, head of Qatar’s state security (Reuters 2024). Kalın’s visit was intended to highlight and deepen Turkey’s lead in the field of intelligence, to discuss the security situation and the transition process.

Kalın also visited the historical Umayyad Mosque in Damascus to perform a prayer of gratitude. This public visit referenced President Erdoğan’s 2012 statement that "one day we will pray in the Umayyad Mosque" (Medyascope 2024), appealing to conservative-nationalist constituencies in Turkey. It also sent a message of Turkish-Sunni victory to regional powers. The Umayyad Mosque, a symbol of rivalry between Iran and Sunni groups during the Syrian civil war, had increasingly come under Iranian influence as the Assad regime grew dependent on Tehran. Sunni groups feared the mosque was falling under Shia sway. Ibrahim Kalın’s public prayer thus signalled defiance toward Iran and reinforced the Sunni-conservative axis Turkey seeks to build in Syria.

A few days later, on December 22, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (former head of the MIT) visited Damascus to discuss the containment of Kurdish militias in northern Syria with interim President al-Sharaa (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2024). Ankara seems to be seeking a defensive pact with Syria. This would include training of the new Syrian military and  establishment of joint forces, and with this a considerable expansion of Turkey’s influence and presence in Syria which has thus far been concentrated only in the north of the country (Makovsky &Saidmehr 2025, Bar’el 2025).

Although Ankara finds itself in a favorable starting position, its capacities remain constrained. Turkey is in a political stalemate; The arrest of President Erdogan’s main political rival Ekrem İmamoğlu in March 2025 has led to a political crisis. Street protests, large-scale mobilization of the opposition and economic boycott of progovernment enterprises have limited the government’s capacity to look elsewhere. Moreover, the political crisis has compounded Turkey’s ongoing economic problems, marked by a collapsing stock market, a plummeting lira, and persistently high inflation.

At the same time, HTS seems to be cautious about becoming too dependent on Turkey; On January 11, the interim government in Damascus introduced an increase of tariffs on goods from Turkey between 300 and 500 percent (Independent Türkce 2025). The new Syrian government is eager to diversify its relations with other regional powers, in an effort to increase agency in its own country.

From Second Position: Gulf States gear up to contain Turkey

HTS’ effort to diversify partnerships and rebuild Syria includes proactive outreach to the economically potent Gulf states. In an interview in December 2024 with the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya, Ahmed al-Sharaa stated that “Saudi Arabia has a major role in Syria’s future. (Al-Arabiya 2024).

However, the Gulf monarchies are all but unified. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have a long-standing rivalry. While Qatar has been supportive of Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have seen Republican Islamism as a threat to their own rule and regional influence.

The Syrian interim government faces a challenge in appealing to both parties. On January 30, Emir Tamim al-Thani of Qatar became the first head of state to visit Syria after Assad’s fall. Just days later, on February 2, 2025, Ahmad al-Sharaa made his first state visit to Saudi Arabia. Yet, large-scale Gulf investments have yet to materialize. Qatar does not want to be the funder of a Turkish subsidiary, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE continues to be ideologically wary of HTS; As much as Saudi Arabia welcomes the fall of Assad, Riyadh retains deep scepticism towards HTS and its ideological roots in al-Qaida. If Saudi Arabia perceives a risk in funding a future problem by consolidating HTS leadership, it is unlikely to divert resources from its ambitious internal reform agenda.

Neither Saudi Arabia, the UAE nor Qatar want Turkey – a non-Arab state – to call the shots in Syria, let alone the region. Instead, they would all like to reassert Arab leadership in managing regional issues and keep foreign actors out. Gulf countries see active involvement in Syria’s reconstruction as an opportunity to further consolidate their growing geopolitical importance[2]. Yet, they lack a coherent strategy and would need to divert funds from their impressive lists of domestic mega-projects. As a modest first step, Qatar has addressed Syria’s burning energy question and has agreed supplying natural gas (Al Jazeera 2025).

From third position: Israel’s strategy of controlled fragmentation

Israel, unlike Turkey or the Gulf states, has no interest in investing in Syria’s reconstruction or political transition. Although the fall of the regime was not Israel’s primary goal – the Assad regime was adversarial but upheld a post-1973 deterrence along the Golan Heights – it has strengthened Israel’s military and strategic position vis-á-vis Iran. It also disrupted Iran’s supply lines to Hezbollah, which has weakened Tehran’s regional reach as well as the relative strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, the fall of the regime also introduced new risks for Israel: a hostile, strong Islamist government in Damascus or the rise of extremist groups like ISIS are both worst case scenarios for Tel Aviv. Confronted with these two options, Israel has pursued a strategy which can be termed as controlled fragmentation.

The strategy of controlled fragmentation is reflected in the nearly 500 airstrikes on Syrian military sites after Assad’s fall, including the T4 airbase and Hama base (BBC Türkçe 2025), aimed at denying HTS and others access to military infrastructure. These strikes may also be designed to deter Turkey, which is negotiating a defense pact with Syria’s interim government and deploying air defense systems to Syrian bases (Ibid.). Technical talks facilitated by Azerbaijan in Baku aimed at de-escalating tensions between Turkey and Israel have not led to concrete results as of yet.

Soon after Assad’s fall, Israel invaded strategic points in the south of Syria, including Mount Hermon and the al-Wahda Dam. Both are strategically important sites to monitor and limit HTS activity and potential attacks of extremist groups (Hall 2025). After October 7 2023, the Israeli government has considered the creation of buffer zones along its borders to prevent further terrorist attacks. Israel has also expanded informal spheres of influence and positioned itself as the protector of the Druze minority in southern Syria. On May 2, 2025, the Israeli Airforce stroke targets in Damascus, near the presidential palace, allegedly to retaliate against sectarian violence against the Druze community in the south, and warned the Syrian army not to move into the Druze regions near the Israeli border (Al Jazeera 2025).

This highlights the clashing positions of Israel and Turkey; While Israel claims Turkey to be a potential patron for Islamist groups, Turkey argues that Israel’s strikes in Syria contribute to the growth of extremist groups like ISIS (BBC Türkçe 2025). Turkey’s overt backing of Hamas and its support for Islamist groups in Syria has led to a breakdown in Turkish-Israeli relations. Tensions between Turkey and Israel entails the highest risk for snapping the rope in Syria.

Meanwhile, Israel seeks to involve President Trump and the U.S. in its dispute with Turkey, to lever its position. Turkey may, however, hold a stronger position in terms of U.S. interests in maintaining stability in Syria as the Trump administration has shown little interest in direct involvement in Syria. Reports indicate that Israel has lobbied the Trump administration to allow Russia to maintain its military bases in Syria, aiming to counterbalance Turkish influence (Gebeily & Pamuk 2025). Despite Russia’s growing ties with Iran, Israel views Russia’s pragmatism and interest in regional stability as valuable for maintaining a balance of power. Israel’s aggressive stance towards HTS could lead to a militarized transition in Syria, where the HTS is forced to focus on immediate security rather than rebuilding state structures (Hall 2025), which risks undermining long-term stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Interestingly, Israel finds more common ground with the Arab states of the region in the case of Syria. While Israel’s war on Gaza and denial of humanitarian aid has sparked public outrage across Arab societies, governments in Jordan, Egypt and the Arab Gulf states have quietly supported Israeli actions against Hamas and Hezbollah. Arab states and Israel have shared interests in limiting both extremist groups and Iran’s regional influence.

Iran and Russia – Redefining Power Structures

While Turkey, Israel and the Gulf states have increased their role in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime dealt a significant blow to both Iran and Russia. Despite a significant shift in power, however, it would be wrong to underestimate the depth and resilience of the networks which tied the Assad regime to these two actors for decades. Iran and Russia’s strategic interests in Syria were never solely limited to Assad’s person, but rather to maintaining a geopolitical foothold in the Levant, securing military bases and influence over regional trade and energy routes, keeping Western influence at bay, and in the case of Iran: managing the conflict with Israel. These objectives can still be pursued despite regime change – even though it has become more difficult.

While Assad’s flight represents a major setback – both strategically and reputation-wise – neither Moscow nor Tehran is dependent on his person. Both countries built complex networks into Syrian power structures over years. For example, the Syrian National Defense Forces (NDF), a major network of pro-Assad militias, was formed under Iranian supervision, and Iran also enjoyed close relations with the Syrian Republican Guard and the 4^th Armoured Division commanded by the former president’s brother (Grajewski 2024). Iran’s “land bridge” through Syria consisted of not only a network of military bases, weapons depots and logistical routes, but also personal relationships and deep involvement in Syrian military decision making. Even though interim President al-Sharaa has announced the dissolution of Assad’s security agencies, and declared all military factions as dissolved, many of the same individuals will likely be integrated into the institutions of the new state – either out of necessity, or in the name of stability and legitimacy (al-Jazeera 2024). Even with the new regime actively seeking to counterwork Iranian influence, it would be very difficult for al-Sharaa to remove every person with relations to Iranian advisors, and still build a robust and functioning security apparatus.

Iran and Russia are now focused on preserving the remnants of the networks they’ve built over the years. For Russia, this includes retaining its military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim – the crown jewels of Russian influence in Syria and the broader Eastern Mediterranean region. This could allow for continued room for manoeuvre within Syrian borders, although now constrained to underground operations – and neither Iran nor Russia are strangers to operating in hostile environments. Still, the question remains open as to how Russia and Iran intend to use these networks — whether to build new relations with HTS, or to disrupt HTS’s path to power consolidation.

Russia seems to be more pragmatic than Iran in its dealings with HTS. The Kremlin appears to have come to terms with the loss of the dependent and loyal Assad-regime. After all, the Assad regime’s isolation had also constrained Russia’s influence in the region, and its military weakness had become costly to Moscow. As mentioned, Russia’s main goal in post-Assad Syria is to maintain its military bases. If Moscow could reach a lasting agreement on this with the HTS, Russia might be willing to support HTS rule, at least indirectly. This also serves to Russia’s other core interest of preventing the reemergence of extremist terrorist groups in the Lebant; After all, HTS has proved to be a reliable force in the fight against ISIS. HTS, on its side, has been cautious not to demonstrate hostility towards Russia, and seems to recognize the strategic importance of building relations with Moscow – and the risks of alienating it (Nakhould & Azhari 2025).

Iran, similarly to Russia, swiftly shifted its rhetoric about HTS after Assad’s fall – from “takfiri terrorists” to “legitimate opposition groups” – signalling an immediate acknowledgment of the new reality (Amwaj Media 2024). However, the strategic situation is remarkably more dire for Iran, as Iran has less to offer the new Syrian leadership, and therefore less leverage to retain its influence. Losing its strategic hold over Syria is a major blow to Iran’s regional strategy; Tehran has lost its land bridge connection to the Mediterranean Sea and the direct connection to allied Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as strategic depth in the ongoing conflict with Israel and the geopolitical competition with Turkey.

Although Iran’s geopolitical standing has suffered the most damage, Tehran retains political and military instruments in its tool box. Iran maintains influence over military factions of the former regime, and extensive knowledge of Syria’s military capabilities, locations and individuals, and with this noteworthy disruptive potential to counter a development which threatens its main strategic objectives – or one that favours its rivals. Iran has proven skilled at playing the long game, and will look to re-insert itself into Syria’s political mosaic whenever it sees an opening to do so.

For now, however, preoccupied with the intense, openly confrontational conflict with Israel and mounting pressure from the Trump administration over its nuclear program (Ravid 2025), Iran lacks the leverage to respond constructively to the immediate loss of influence in Syria. Instead, it is likely to resort to zero-sum tactics aimed at undermining the establishment of any power structures which threaten its immediate strategic interests and increase the influence of its regional rivals.

An Uncertain Outlook

Syria is at a critical juncture. The country’s development going forward will determine the stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean region and beyond. The collapse of the Assad regime has laid bare the critical condition of the Syrian state and economy, and created a profound power vacuum. Many regional actors are interested in filling this vacuum, and to shape Syria’s future to their liking. However, none of them have the capabilities available to take decisive action.

Therefore, post-Assad Syria finds itself caught in a precarious tug-of-war. Regional actors, unable to actually reach their goals, may end up resorting to sabotage of their opponents instead of contributing constructively to rebuilding the Syrian state and economy. Eyeing the potential of being torn apart, the HTS government aims to balance and diversify the involvement of foreign actors, but has limited agency whilst also working to consolidate the state itself. The Syrian population, already devastated by years of war and humanitarian catastrophe, remains trapped in this stalemate. As reconstruction stalls and basic services remain scarce, confidence in the interim government may quickly erode (ECHO 2025). The longer the fragile status quo persists, the greater the risks – not only for Syria, but for the broader stability of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The fragile status quo is exacerbated by the absence of effective regional governance mechanisms capable of mediating disputes and coordinating reconstruction efforts. Existing institutions such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League are limited by narrow mandates and exclusionary membership structures. This has left the field open to ad hoc arrangements and unilateral actions, which not only fail to address root causes, but risks further entrenching competition and fragmentation. This severely limits the space for exchange, negotiations and regional governance solutions, which leaves the regional actors with zero-sum solutions. An inclusive regional framework could enhance robustness to handle external power intervention and facilitate diplomatic solutions over power play. Without such a framework, the ongoing geopolitical tug-of-war threatens not just to stall Syria’s recovery, but to snap the already frayed rope holding the state together — plunging the region into renewed instability.

Despite the bleak outlook, opportunities for constructive engagement remain. External actors like China, with fewer historical entanglements in the region, is to a larger degree perceived as neutral by regional actors and may therefore be well-positioned to play a constructive role, politically and economically, to prevent a total collapse of the Syrian state. The European Union, and member states such as Austria, also have a potential role to play, particularly in humanitarian assistance, local energy projects, irrigation, the reconstruction of the education system, refugee repatriation and rebuilding governance institutions.

[1] This was mainly proved in the North-Western province of Idlib, where HTS ruled from 2015. Under the protection of Turkey, Idlib had become a safe haven for various Islamist groups and more than a million of internally displaced people (EUAA 2023).

[2] Over the last years, the United States' geopolitical priorities have gradually shifted from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. The US has increasingly relied on the conservative Gulf monarchies in containing Iran and guaranteeing Israel’s security. This has been at the expense of the strategic importance of major US allies such as Turkey and Egypt.

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