Africa’s growing interest in BRICS: Between pragmatism and the strive for more sovereignty
Africa’s growing interest in BRICS: Between pragmatism and the strive for more sovereignty
Policy Analysis 11 /2025
By Angela Meyer
Key words: BRICS, Africa, world order, Multipolarity
Executive Summary:
At their annual summit in Johannesburg in August 2023, the BRICS group, formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, decided to expand their alliance by admitting new member states. More than 40 countries expressed interest in joining or associating with BRICS, and 22 submitted formal applications (European Parliament 2024a). Among those wishing to join BRICS or at least strengthening ties with the organization are many African states. The Policy Analysis explores the reasons for this growing trend among African states and lays out the consequences for relations with Europe and the West. Although the reasons for the BRICS' attractiveness varies from one country to another, collaboration with BRICS of any kind seems to promise African states the opportunity to diversify economic and political alliances, counterbalance asymmetric relations with the West, strengthen self-determination and increase impact in global governance. In that regard, the BRICS group presents an attractive alternative for African states and an opportunity to make themselves heard on the international stage. After all, BRICS advocates for an architecture of the world economy and global governance that reflects the changing global balance of power and gives emerging economies a stronger voice in global decision-making. The EU struggles to come to terms with new realities. It tries recalibrating its Africa policy. Austria with no colonial past in Africa and hardly any significant vested interests on the continent would be well placed to become a credible and impartial actor. Neutrality and Vienna’s reputation as a diplomatic hub could be assets. However, it requires investment in relations with African countries and active involvement in shaping a fundamentally renewed Africa-Europe partnership.
Key takeaways:
- Over the past years, there has been increasing interest among African countries in joining or associating with the BRICS group of states.
- A major driver of this development is the desire to take part in and benefit from a dynamic alliance of rapidly growing economies.
- However, this trend can also be linked to a growing call for self-determination in more and more African countries, along with their efforts to assert themselves as sovereign states – and thus the quest to overcome traditional asymmetric relations with the West and diversify international alliances and partnerships.
- Against this backdrop, the BRICS group presents an attractive partner for Africa as it actively promotes a new and more inclusive world order — a counterpoint to the previous Western dominated one. BRICS advocates for an architecture of the world economy and global governance that reflects the changing global balance of power and gives emerging economies a stronger voice in global decision-making.
- In a context where the EU struggles with recalibrating its Africa policy, Austria is well placed to become a credible and impartial actor – without significant vested interests and a colonial past in Africa, and drawing on diplomatic skills acquired through decades of active neutrality and its reputation as diplomatic hub. All this offers good opportunities for Austria to further strengthen its relations with African countries in an increasingly multipolar world and to contribute to shaping the basis for a renewed Africa-Europe partnership.
Introduction
2026 will mark the 20th anniversary of the founding of what was then known as the BRIC group. Initially formed by Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006, BRIC was joined in 2010 by South Africa and was renamed in BRICS. Two decades later, BRICS has turned into BRICS+, now with ten members[1] and ten partner countries[2].
Among these new BRICS member states and partners that have joined the group since 2024 are four African states. Egypt and Ethiopia became BRICS members in 2024 and Nigeria and Uganda joined as BRICS partners one year later. Over the last years, many other African countries have expressed interest in a BRICS membership or at least in further closer cooperation. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the main reasons and motives behind the growing interest of more and more African states in BRICS. Given the close economic relations that already exist between Africa and individual BRICS states at the bilateral level, the key incentives are likely to go beyond pure pragmatism and the desire to take part in a dynamic alliance of rapidly growing economies. The paper rather analyses the attractiveness of the BRICS group to African states within the current context of geopolitical shifts and Africa’s strive for greater sovereignty and autonomy in global affairs. Against this background, it examines and discusses the extent to which the pivot towards the BRICS group reflects Africa’s affirmation or even commitment for a new multipolar world that is not dominated by the West. In this respect, the paper’s main goal is to contribute to a better understanding of key motives and reasons behind Africa’s growing interest in BRICS with regard to historical, economic, political and geopolitical aspects rather than providing a normative and critical analysis of the BRICS group itself and the prospects and perspectives for Africa.
BRICS: Cornerstone of a multipolar world order
The term “BRIC” was first used in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, an economist at the investment bank Goldman Sachs. In his publication ‘Building Better Global Economic BRICs’ (O’Neill 2001), O’Neill coined the term BRIC, composed of the initial letters of four major emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India and China, and alluding to the English word for building blocks, to express the strong growth of these emerging economies and predict their growing share of global gross domestic product (GDP).
BRIC was by then only a concept which aimed to underpin O’Neill‘s argument that these four states would witness a faster economic growth than traditional Western economies, due to their wealth of natural resources, their dynamic economies and their share of the world population. They were thus considered as promising growth markets for international investments.
Within the BRICS group, however, this founding myth – that the alliance originated solely from an investment banker’s analysis – is rejected. Instead, member states emphasise that regular informal exchanges had already been taking place before, particularly between India, China and Russia, which laid the foundation for what subsequently became deeper cooperation. The central subject at stake was how to make the architecture of the world economy and global governance fairer and in line with the changing global balance of power. Central issues included the role of global currencies and national sovereignty (ICG 2023).
In 2006, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China met on the sidelines of the United Nations’ (UN) General Assembly in New York. This meeting is regarded as the unofficial founding moment of BRIC as it marked the beginning of informal diplomatic alignment and coordination among the four governments. From then on, they gradually moved the group beyond purely economic cooperation. From the outset, key concerns centred on the perceived one-sided Western domination of world order and international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, whose significance was thus called into question. They instead promoted a vision of a more just and inclusive multipolar world order. These developments unfolded against the backdrop of the United States’ growing hegemonic ambitions under President George W. Bush, reflected in militaristic policies such as the so called Bush Doctrine and the Europeans' alignment with these policies. BRICS was formally founded on 16 June 2009 at a summit of heads of state and government in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Influenced by the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the summit focused on the G20’s role in addressing the crisis, as well as on developing a more inclusive global financial architecture, supporting a multilateral trading system, and promoting cooperation in science, energy, education, and humanitarian assistance (BRIC 2009). Moreover, the four founding states emphasised their quest for a fairer multipolar world order based on international law and the principles of equity, mutual respect in particular for state sovereignty, cooperation and collective decision making – directives that are reaffirmed at every annual summit (Brazilian BRICS Presidency website). In 2010, South Africa was invited to join the group as an additional member and BRIC was subsequently renamed in BRICS. The choice of South Africa as a fifth member was based both on economic and geopolitical reasons. South Africa’s membership symbolised the inclusion of Africa into the aspired, fairer new world order. With South Africa’s inclusion, BRICS has been represented in all parts of the Global South. Moreover, South Africa represents the largest economy on the African continent. South Africa’s long-standing demand for a stronger representation of the Global South in international organisations (ICG 2023) has aligned with BRICS' request of a reform of the UN, the IMF and the World Bank. BRICS countries challenge the over-dominance of Western states and demand for a stronger voice and representation of the Global South in international decision-making bodies. In addition, BRICS aims to create alternative bodies to Western dominated ones, especially finance institutions in order to reduce the Global South’s dependency on Western-dominated structures and institutions. On the 6th BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil in 2014, member states founded the New Development Bank (NBD). Based in Shanghai, the NDB’s purpose is to finance development projects in the BRICS member states and other countries in the Global South. The NDB positions itself as an alternative to the World Bank with its headquarters in Washington DC. The NDB focuses on funding projects in the areas of infrastructure, energy and environment. Contrary to the World Bank, NDB credits come without policy conditionality, such as structural adjustment programmes and privatisation. In 2025, a decade after its creation, the bank has approved 39 billion US-Dollars for a total of 120 mostly infrastructure projects in Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Bangladesh and Egypt (Carneiro 2025). Although the NDB still remains relatively small compared to other international development banks, it can be seen as a sign for the ongoing “shift in the development finance landscape” (Carneiro 2025). In addition to the NDB, BRICS members also founded their own monetary fund, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). It is aimed at strengthening financial stability. CRA, while formally operational, has not yet been activated in practice (Canuto & Saraiva 2025). Therefore, its real effects remain to be seen.
Finally, BRICS states also try to develop common positions on major political and humanitarian crises, such as those in Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, Haiti, Syria, Lebanon, Ukraine or Gaza. In 2024, BRICS’ foreign ministers followed South Africa in jointly condemning the war in Gaza and published a common statement that strongly criticised the Israeli attacks (Brazilian BRICS Presidency website). This has stood in contrast to the positions of the majority of Western governments which have either refrained from openly condemning Israel or been hesitant.
Africa’s existing relations with a dynamic alliance of rapidly growing economies
Economically, the group has been a global heavyweight. Calculations taking into account all current BRICS members show that between 2009 and 2022, the group’s nominal GDP saw an 2,64-fold increase from 9,8 million US-Dollars to around 25,8 million US-Dollars (Wilson 2024). In 2025, the group’s share in the global nominal GDP has been 28%. In terms of purchasing power parity, this share is even as high as 35% which is more than the G7. BRICS+ countries represent 48% and thus almost half of the world population, while only 11% live in the G7 countries (IMF 2025).
In recent years, in addition to South Africa, a number of other African states have showed interest in joining the group, including Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Papa 2024). At the 15th BRICS summit in August 2023 in Johannesburg in South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia were invited to join as new member states, whereas in 2025 Nigeria und Uganda were granted the new status of BRICS partners.
For Africa, the BRICS group is interesting because of its economic dynamism and the rapid growth of the member states’ economies. Economically, the opportunity to take part in and benefit from this dynamic is a central motive behind Africa’s growing orientation towards the BRICS group. Moreover, the NDB constitutes an appealing alternative to the World Bank, providing loans with minimal conditionality and without requirements for structural adjustment or austerity policies.
BRICS membership and partnership promise in addition to bilateral economic relations, further integration and political coordination with the world’s fastest growing economies.
Among BRICS states, China is by far the most active and evident actor on the African continent (Africa Business Partners 2025). From the 1990s, Beijing’s economic engagement with Africa and its trade volume have rapidly grown. Since 2009, China has been the continent’s first trading partner (Zhu 2025). Over the past years, the trade volume has been rising annually by 5%. In 2024, it reached 295 billion US-Dollars (Zhu 2025). China is also an important partner when it comes to development and infrastructure. Since 2013, China has increasingly invested in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale infrastructure and development project with a particular focus on improving trade and investment relations as well as connectivity between China and participating countries, including those in Africa (He 2023). Since the start of this initiative, Chinese investments in Africa in the field of transport, energy and telecommunication have continuously grown. Moreover, China is also providing financial support and loans to fund African infrastructure development initiatives.
During the last two decades, economic relations between Africa and India have likewise demonstrated consistent growth. Since 2003, trade between India and the African continent has increased by 18% per year, and in 2023, the total volume was 103 billion US-Dollars (Nantulya 2023). This development made India become Africa’s third important trade partner, after China and the EU (Nantulya 2023; Qazi et al. 2025). However, similar to Sino-African trade relations, Indo-African trade is also relatively unbalanced: while India’s imports from Africa mainly consist of raw materials, with crude oil from Nigeria accounting for a significant share, India primarily exports industrial goods such as refined petroleum products and medicines to Africa (Qazi et al. 2025). At the same time, however, India is also an important source of funding for African countries. India has been a member of the African Development Bank since 1983 and has since lent a total of 70 billion US-Dollars to Africa, mainly in the form of public-private partnerships and with special provisions to protect borrowers from over-indebtedness (Nantulya 2023). India sees its contacts with Africa as part of its support for South-South cooperation. Relations are also facilitated and promoted by the large Indian diaspora of approximately 3 million people, who live mainly in Southern and Eastern Africa (Jaldi 2021).
Although cooperations between Moscow and Africa date back to Soviet times, they have received increased Western media attention especially over the last decade. Since the early 2000s, Russia has been trying to revive contacts established during the Soviet area and to put them on a new basis. Whereas, in Western media, relations between Russia and Africa have been often reduced to military cooperation, focusing on arms exports and military presence in some countries, Russia is also an important economic partner for many African states. Although, the trade volume lies far behind that of China, India or the EU, trade relations with Russia are an important pillar of further economic diversification for many African countries. In 2023, the trade volume was 24 billion US-Dollars (Ecofin Agency 2024). While still below the 40 billion aimed by Russia, this is a sharp increase by 37%, compared to the previous year (Ecofin Agency 2024). A major part of exports from Africa to Russia are agricultural products (60%), followed by ores and textiles. Also Russia is exporting primarily agricultural products, especially wheat, to African countries as well as oil, gas and coal, and electrical equipment (European Parliament 2024). In addition, Russia has set up important study, fellowship and scholarship programmes for African students. Parallel to increased economic relations, Moscow has also tried to increase its political influence. Since 2019, Moscow regularly organises Russia-Africa-Summits which are attended by a high number of African heads of states and other government officials. Africa also prominently features in the Russian government’s 2023 foreign policy concept (MFA Russia 2023; European Parliament 2024).
Brazil’s involvement in Africa has intensified, particularly under the presidencies of Lula da Silva (2003-2011, and since 2023). Cooperation mainly consists of agricultural technical assistance and investment in natural resources and agriculture. At the 2nd Brazil-Africa Dialogue in May 2025, greater emphasis was placed on food security, sustainable rural development and the transfer of agricultural knowledge and technology (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2025). The partnership also includes investments by Brazilian state-owned companies such as Petrobras in the African oil and gas sector and the opening of African markets to Brazilian food products. For President Lula, cooperation with Africa is a key element of South-South cooperation, and he aims for Brazil to serve as its voice (Mongan 2025).
South Africa is Africa’s largest and strongest economy. Economic and trade relations traditionally focus on neighbouring countries and other countries in southern Africa within the framework of the regional economic community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Main trading partners are Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe (South African Government 2025). However, with the official launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2021, which South Africa has been implementing since January 2024, there has recently been an intensification of economic activity beyond the SADC zone (Embassy of Switzerland in Pretoria 2025). In line with the AfCFTA, which aims to promote intra-African trade, South Africa is increasingly expanding its trade and economic relations to other regions of the continent. While this development makes South Africa a key player in intra-continental trade, the country has long been a major investor in development projects in other African countries, particularly in areas such as construction projects, IT and telecommunications, health, financial services and the green economy (South African Government 2025).
BRICS: More than an institution
Given the largely long-standing, growing and intensifying economic relations between African and individual BRICS states, it becomes clear that Africa’s current interest for BRICS goes beyond mere economic motives. Rather, it is possible to put the actual trends in line with Africa’s – and more specifically the African population’s – self-confidence that has been growing over the last years. 65 years after the end of colonisation in most of Africa, the call for self-determination and the desire to assert themselves as sovereign states are becoming increasingly apparent in more and more countries. In francophone Africa, this move is particularly strong and visible (Meyer, Simonet & Späth 2025). In most countries in West and Central Africa where strong and exclusive links had been maintained to former colonial power France, this relationship is increasingly called into question or has ended (Meyer 2025). Since 1960, Paris was particularly eager and interested in keeping economic, monetary, military and diplomatic ties to its former colonies and other francophone countries alive. The resulting system of so called "Françafrique“ was marked by covert or partly even open interference into domestic affairs, including regime changes, as well as the permanent presence of French troops and military bases, pegging the common currencies (CFA francs) in Central and West Africa first to the French franc and then the Euro, as well as a privileged access to natural resources. This was based on exceptionally close personal relations between French and African politicians and elites, grounded on corruption and clientelism (Meyer 2025; Tarrit & Noirot 2014). Over the last years, the "Françafrique” system has begun to falter after several African states have declared their intention to end their traditional relations with France. Some have even taken already concrete measures. In late 2024, Chad and Senegal terminated their long-standing defence accords with France and both declared the closure of French military bases and demanded the departure of French troops. Côte d’Ivoire took a similar step only a few weeks later. In the Sahel countries Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in particular, but also in some other countries, such as in Senegal, the Central African Republic or Chad, anti-French sentiments have been quite strong among the population. While in this context also criticism of the United States and Europe, and especially their military operations on the continent, has grown louder, calls for a rethinking of traditional relations with the West in general are also being heard in other parts of Africa beyond the francophone regions (Meyer 2025).
An essential factor in this regard is the emergence of a young generation which is well informed and well connected through social media and wishes to break with the past and prevailing neo-colonial structures. In a number of countries, such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Chad und Ethiopia, also young politicians have come to power and seek to end the unequal relations with the West. This young Africa wishes to replace one-sided asymmetric structures by multiple partnerships that are based on equal terms and allow them to assert their sovereignty and take decisions independently and without any foreign interference. However, it is made clear that the intention is not to completely break with former allies such as the EU or France. Rather, the aim is a diversification of partnerships with a view to globally gaining more autonomy as well as pursuing a path of development based on international cooperation with transparent goals and without exclusivity (Sam 2024; Le Monde 2024).
Against this backdrop, BRICS presents an attractive partner. It promotes a new and more inclusive world order — a counterpoint to the previous Western dominated one. In their common declaration at the end of the BRICS Summit in October 2024 in Kazan, Russia, held under the theme “Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security”, the participating heads of state and government emphasised the necessity that emerging economies should get a stronger say in global decision-making processes and to making these better attuned to contemporary realities (BRICS 2024). In this regard, BRICS also stressed its support for mutual respect among its members.
By embodying its identity centred on the principles of respect and fairness and advocating for a more equitable and inclusive global governance, BRICS presents itself to countries in the Global South as a body that gives a voice to those who have suffered not only under colonialism but also endured neo-colonial practices (Valdai 2025). A view that apparently is increasingly shared by more and more African countries.
Already over a decade ago, Bertrand Badie referred to “humiliated” states in international relations, i.e. states that have been systematically belittled, placed under guardianship, kept away from decision-making forums, or whose leaders have been internationally stigmatised (Badie 2014). There are many examples for such humiliations in Africa (Badie 2014). One striking example is former French President François Hollande’s neocolonial statement in spring 2013 when he declared that he wants “elections to be held in Mali at the end of July” and that he will “be uncompromising on this point” (own translation, Duhem 2013). In a similar tone, only a couple of months later, President Hollande made clear, this time with regard to domestic political developments in the Central African Republic, what influence France continued to exert on its former colonies: “We cannot allow a president, who has been unable to do anything and has let things slide, to remain in office” (own translation, Jeune Afrique 2013). This recurrent sentiment of humiliation has also been reinforced by offensive remarks from other high-ranking Western politicians. In 2022, former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell described the Global South as a “jungle”, compared to the European “garden”: “Europe is a garden. We have built a garden. Everything works. It is the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the humankind has been able to build (…). The rest of the world (…) is not exactly a garden. Most of the rest of the world is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden. The gardeners should take care of it, but they will not protect the garden by building walls. (…) Because the jungle has a strong growth capacity, and the wall will never be high enough in order to protect the garden” (EEAS 2022). More recent examples include a statement by French President Emmanuel Macron in January 2025, in response to the aforementioned decision of several African states to terminate their military cooperation with France: “France is not in decline in Africa, it is simply (…) reorganising itself. (But) I think people have forgotten to thank us. That’s okay, it will come in time. (…) I say this for all the African governments who have not had the courage in the face of public opinion to bear it that none of them would be in a sovereign country today if the French army had not been deployed in this region” (own translation, Elysée 2025).
Faced with this kind of neocolonial rhetoric, more and more African governments see in the BRICS framework an opportunity to overcome their role as “perpetual recipient of donor assistance” and to assert their states’ sovereignty with a view to becoming a respected and fully-fledged partner (Nikolskaya & Matveeva 2025).
Another central aspect is non-interference in domestic political affairs. The fact that an increasing number of African states have expanded their relations with Russia or China in recent years is also due to these countries' neutral stance on domestic political developments. While the West generally reacts to domestic issues and political changes, African countries are accusing their Western partners of inconsistent behaviour and double standards, for example when unconstitutional regime changes in countries such as Mali (2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (2022) or Niger (2023) were condemned, while those in Chad (2021) or Gabon (2023) were overlooked in order not to jeopardise long-lasting relations. In contrast, Russia rarely comments on domestic political developments in its partner countries in Africa. Whereas China has become increasingly engaged in peace and security in Africa, a major objective is to protect its economic interests. Beijing has been significantly contributing personnel to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and has been engaged in crisis diplomacy and peace mediation efforts, such as in South Sudan. China is also a major supporter of the African Union’s peace and security architecture, particularly in form of funding, training, and logistical support. A key driving force behind this engagement are however Beijing’s trade and investment activities on the continent and the concern to ensure a stable environment for them (Mariani 2022; Mariani 2022a).
Finally, a key concern for Africa when choosing international alliances is transparency, particularly with regard to mutual interests and agreements. If the partnership between the EU and Africa is currently in deep crisis, this is also largely because Africans criticise the lack of transparency and openness regarding the interests underlying European cooperation with the continent (Knaepen 2024; Meyer, Simonet & Späth 2025). A major reproach is that often economic, political and strategic interests are hidden behind stated development goals. As a consequence, many African governments are no longer willing to maintain partnerships in which the interests behind the offers and the terms of trade in the agreements are not clearly stated. The fact that members of the BRICS group are becoming increasingly involved on the African continent, as described above, can be related to the fact that agreements are quite clear and mutual interests disclosed (Meyer, Simonet & Späth 2025).
Conclusions: Is BRICS anti-Western? And what recommendations can be made for Austria?
This analysis may finally open up to the question whether BRICS is against the West? It is certainly true that BRICS’ fundamental goal is to reduce the Western dominance in global governance and instead strengthen the international role of the Global South (Seiwert 2024). The group presents itself as the forum of almost the majority of the world’s population and a voice of those who have so far been mostly excluded from global decisions despite their demographic and economic weight. In their interest, BRICS pledges “to redress the inequalities caused by the ways of functioning of developed economies” (Kodabux 2024). But interpreting this as anti-Western” would be “a gross oversimplification” (Seiwert 2024). Rather, citing India’s Prime Minister Modi, BRICS states do consider themselves not as anti-Western but simply as “non-Western” (TOI 2024).
Furthermore, BRICS is neither standing for any new division of the world into blocs nor does it see itself as “one pole of a two-sided geopolitical competition between China and Russia and the West” (Seiwert 2024). On the contrary. The group advocates for a multipolar world in which the Global South countries should get their say and the place they deserve as demographic and economic majority. Hence, the group aims to counterbalance the Western-dominated post-World War II system and its institutions. Its aim is not replacing multilateralism, but diversifying it and increasing the sway and voice of emergent non-Western economic and political powers.
If BRICS will be able to realise this, remains to be seen, as well as whether the expectations of African states will be met. But even if there are sceptics and critics of BRICS for various motives and reasons (Delcourt 2024; Sharma 2025; Misra 2025) the growing role of the Global South is a reality that cannot be denied, even without BRICS as a framework. Or referring to Bertrand Badie, not acknowledging this growing role and the reality behind but instead trying to maintain the old world order, inherited from the Cold War, would simply go against the tide of history (Badie 2016).
From the perspective of Austrian policy making, the shift towards a multipolar world comes with both challenges and opportunities. Traditionally, EU strategies and policies towards Africa have been shaped by the national priorities of countries with deep-rooted interests like France. Whereas the EU has recently been making efforts to recalibrate its Africa policy (European Council 2025), this legacy poses a fundamental dilemma: a continuation along established lines of policy making risks deepening the current crisis in EU-African relations, while any new attempt by Brussels to come up with a common European approach will most likely encounter scepticism in Africa. At best, such efforts may lack the necessary support of key EU member states; at worst, they may highlight further European divisions in global affairs. Against this backdrop, Austria is in a unique position. Without significant vested interests and a colonial past in Africa, and drawing on diplomatic skills acquired through decades of active neutrality, Austria is well placed to act as a credible and impartial partner. Vienna in particular has a well-known reputation as a diplomatic hub, hosting many key international institutions, such as UN organisations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and providing a forum for international negotiations and exchanges. All this offers good opportunities for Austria to further strengthen its relations with African countries in an increasingly multipolar world and to contribute to shaping the basis for a renewed Africa-Europe partnership.
[1] In 2024, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Ethiopia, and in 2025 Indonesia joined as member states. Saudi Arabia has also been admitted to BRICS as a member but formal ratification confirmation from the Saudi side has not yet been clearly made public. Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam are BRICS partners.
[2] BRICS partners is a new category introduced in 2023. Whereas only full BRICS member countries have complete decision-making power and voting rights, partner countries are invited to participating in the summits as well as in other meetings if there is consensus among the members. Prospective countries may see the partner status as a pathway towards full membership.
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