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The ‘geopolitical’ European Union and the new Transatlantic relation 100 days after Donald Trump’s inauguration: How to navigate the storm?

Policy Analysis 7 / 2025
By Loïc Simonet

Executive Summary

Donald Trump’s second administration is a test for the “geopolitical” EU. It comes at a time of morosity and decline in Europe, both in terms of hard and soft power, and reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies and dependencies. In Ukraine, “Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cynically assessed.

At the same time, Donald Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy plays an accelerating role for the EU’s long-awaited strategic autonomy. The narrative is rapidly changing and the Commission’s first initiatives are promising, but the EU needs not only competitiveness but also political ambition. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ are emerging in Europe across old borders such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO, reviving the concept of ‘concentric circles’. They might provide Europe with much needed impulse, but also enhance divisions and internal quarrels, which is in Trump’s strategy. Trump.2 also accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world and leaves Europe alone versus ‘the Rest’. With EU’s more assertive stance and strategic quantum leap, it might also question and jeopardize Europe’s original peace project.

The key finding presented in this Policy Analysis are the following:

• Trump’s ‘after shock’ reveals EU’s major structural deficiencies. The wake-up call is beneficial on the long run, but makes Europe’s short term reaction much more difficult.
• Europe’s security guarantees to Ukraine without a U.S. backstop will be a test for the Europeans’ credibility and capacities.
• EU’s both narrative and concrete action are fastly adapting. Based on the ReArm Europe plan, and theWhite Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, Brussels should be in a position to take key decisions before June 2025. However, beyond competitiveness and defensive military effectiveness, the EU needs political ambition.
• Perfectly aware of the European ‘kaleidoscope’, Donald Trump will not hesitate to press the finger where it hurts, in every capital, hoping to divide the Twenty-Seven. The EU members must preserve their unity and coherence of action.
• In a post-Western world, the EU needs to step-up as a global superpower and overcome its crisis of confidence. Surprinsingly, converging voices from China and the ‘Global South’ are calling for the such a role.
• Austria must sail safely through the storm. The lines are moving on formerly controversial issues such as joint indebtedness and mutualization to boost European defense. The reshuffling of alliances in Europe, the return of UK and the impulse provided by the Weimar+ format might represent a risk for the neutral and ‘frugal’ Austria, which must avoid being relegated to the EU’s external circle.

 Zussamenfassung

 Die zweite Amtszeit von Donald Trump ist ein Test für die „geopolitische“ EU. Sie fällt in eine Zeit der Verdrossenheit und des Niedergangs Europas, sowohl in Bezug auf die harte als auch die weiche Macht, und offenbart die großen strukturellen Schwächen und Abhängigkeiten der EU. In der Ukraine ist „die Ära Europas vorbei“, wie der ehemalige russische Präsident Dmitri Medwedew zynisch feststellte.

Gleichzeitig spielt die menschenverachtende Außenpolitik von Donald Trump eine immer wichtigere Rolle für die lang ersehnte strategische Autonomie der EU. Das Narrativ ändert sich rasch und die ersten Initiativen der Kommission sind vielversprechend, aber die EU braucht nicht nur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, sondern auch politischen Ehrgeiz. In Europa entstehen neue „Koalitionen der Willigen“ über alte Grenzen hinweg, wie z. B. Brexit-bedingte Spaltungen oder Rivalitäten zwischen der EU und der NATO, die das Konzept der „konzentrischen Kreise“ wiederbeleben. Sie könnten Europa dringend benötigte Impulse geben, aber auch Spaltungen und interne Streitigkeiten verstärken, was in Trumps Strategie liegt. Trump.2 beschleunigt auch die „Entwestlichung“ der Welt und lässt Europa gegenüber „dem Rest“ allein. Mit der selbstbewussteren Haltung der EU und dem strategischen Quantensprung könnte auch das ursprüngliche Friedensprojekt Europas in Frage gestellt und gefährdet werden.

Die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse dieser Politikanalyse sind:

• Trumps „Nach-Schock“ offenbart die großen strukturellen Schwächen der EU. Der Weckruf ist langfristig von Vorteil, erschwert aber die kurzfristige Reaktion Europas erheblich.
• Europas Sicherheitsgarantien für die Ukraine ohne einen US-Backstop werden ein Test für die Glaubwürdigkeit und die Kapazitäten der Europäer sein.
• Sowohl die Darstellung als auch die konkreten Maßnahmen der EU passen sich schnell an. Auf der Grundlage des ReArm Europe-Plans und des Weißbuchs „Europäische Verteidigung – Bereitschaft 2030“ sollte Brüssel in der Lage sein, bis Juni 2025 wichtige Entscheidungen zu treffen. Neben der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und der defensiven militärischen Wirksamkeit braucht die EU jedoch auch politischen Ehrgeiz.
• Donald Trump ist sich des europäischen „Kaleidoskops“ sehr wohl bewusst und wird nicht zögern, in jeder Hauptstadt den Finger in die Wunde zu legen, in der Hoffnung, die Siebenundzwanzig zu spalten. Die EU-Mitglieder müssen ihre Einheit und die Kohärenz ihres Handelns bewahren.
• In einer post-westlichen Welt muss die EU als globale Supermacht auftreten und ihre Vertrauenskrise überwinden. Überraschenderweise mehren sich die Stimmen aus China und dem „globalen Süden“, die eine solche Rolle fordern.
• Österreich muss sicher durch den Sturm segeln. Bei ehemals umstrittenen Themen wie der gemeinsamen Verschuldung und der Gegenseitigkeit zur Stärkung der europäischen Verteidigung verschieben sich die Fronten. Die Neuordnung der Bündnisse in Europa, die Rückkehr Großbritanniens und die Impulse des Weimar+-Formats könnten ein Risiko für das neutrale und „genügsame“ Österreich darstellen, das vermeiden muss, in den Außenkreis der EU verwiesen zu werden.

Introduction

Trump’s second administration represents a "maximum disruption" for the EU and the transatlantic relationship, as German Ambassador to Washington Andreas Michaelis described it in a leaked document (Siebold & Heine, 2025). Joe Biden’s presidency was certainly not the ‘oasis’ of transatlantic harmony that many naively predicted, with its abrupt and uncoordinated U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the AUKUS[1] humiliation, the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act and the hesitant strategy in Ukraine. But Trump’s return to the White House has plunged Europe’s business leaders and policymakers into a precarious era.

Between Europe and the United States, the rupture is deep and historic. The rift came to the fore at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, with Vice-President Vance’s ‘MAGA’ speech giving a glimpse of ideological war and confirming that America would make no favor to its European ‘allies’. Until 2025, Europe and the U.S. were “Allies with different worldviews and agendas” (Lightfoot & Bel, 2020, 6). It is now clear that the U.S. administration is openly hostile to the EU, which President Trump perceives as directed against his interests: “The EU was created to ’screw the US'”, he said (Reuters, 2025). From Internet regulation to trade, from climate change to defense, there is almost no aspect of European policy that Trump does not seem poised to upend. By publicly claiming a territory that has long belonged to a NATO member of the European Union (Greenland, owned by Denmark), Donald Trump is doing something that even Putin would never have dared to do. This rift will be a test for the “geopolitical” Europe that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen coined in 2019 (Von der Leyen, 2019).

“There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s famous words could not be more relevant to the time we live in. In such a volatile and constantly evolving context, this policy analysis does not ambition to offer a thorough and definitive ‘scientific’ assessment of the situation, but rather empirically addresses a series of interconnected consequences of Donald Trump’s return to office.

This paper explains why the rupture comes at the worst possible time for Europe (1). It continues with Ukraine, which has become a bone of contention between the new U.S. administration and Europe (2). It asks whether the ‘after-shock’ of Trump’s (re)election could act as a catalyst for the long-awaited European strategic autonomy (3) and insists on the need of political ambition (4). Without sufficient impulse from Brussels, new ‘coalitions of the willing’ might take over (5) which could increase the risks of division in chaos in Europe (6). This piece asks two questions: does the new Transatlantic relation enhance Europe’s isolation versus ‘the Rest’? (7) And does EU’s new strategic move and capacity effort threaten its original peace project? (8). It ends up with two remarks/recommendations to Austria (9).

1.      Trump’s election comes at the worst possible time for Europe

Economic growth in Europe is sluggish, leadership has stalled and pressure from Chinese exports is increasingly intense. Whether in terms of hard power (defense and the economy) or soft power (the ability to project our values beyond our borders), our “old continent” is falling behind. U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) grew up by 2.8% in 2024, compared with just 0.7% in the euro zone (Leparmentier & Charrel, 2025). The EU’s average GDP stood at €40,060, while the U.S.’ average was €80,023; as Euronews Business assessed, Mississippi, the poorest state in the United States, is close to surpassing Europe’s largest economy Germany’s GDP per capita (Yanatma, 2025).

Europeans have allowed major structural deficiencies to become entrenched, and these are now weakening them considerably. Mario Draghi’s alarming report on The future of European competitiveness (Draghi, 2024) has been echoed by Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank (Lagarde, 2024). Each member state acts essentially autonomously, resulting in duplication and overlapping that generate inefficiency. As Enrico Letta explained in his report Much more than a market, such fragmentation is a dramatic weakness for the EU, providing Wall Street and the American and Chinese industrial systems a decisive advantage (Letta, 2024). The war in Ukraine has reinforced the member states’ dependence on American armaments (F35 combat aircraft, Apache helicopters, Himars rocket launchers, M1A1 Abrams tanks).

The Franco-German couple, the traditional anchor of the European Union, has lately experienced a low point. Despite the signing of a Franco-German Cooperation and Integration treaty in Aachen (Germany) in 2019, the relationship between Paris and Berlin has been deteriorating for almost a decade. Although E. Macron and O. Scholtz held immediate talks after Trump’s victory to coordinate their position, it is notorious that Paris and Berlin have held differing views on various issues in recent years. Whereas France, the champion of strategic autonomy, advocates the establishment of a tough balance of power with Washington, Germany has little desire to open a new front with the United States, at a time when the country is going through an unprecedented economic and political crisis. The vision of “change through trade” that dominated post-Cold War German foreign policy has collapsed in the face of the Zeitenwende. Trump’s (re)election coincides with Germany’s increased commercial dependence from the U.S., which in 2024 overtook China as Germany’s main economic partner (Der Spiegel, 2025), which reduces Berlin’s room for manoeuver. Germany is far more dependent on the U.S. economy than it was in 2017, at the start of the Republican president’s first term. 13% of the German cars are absorbed by the U.S., and 23% of the parmaceutical products. According to the German Economic Institute (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft  – IW), if Europe and the USA were to raise their respective tariffs to 20% in a trade dispute, it would cost the German economy 180 billion euros. At the end of the Trump presidency, Germany’s GDP would be by 1.5% lower compared with the level that economists estimated it should have reached (Obst, 2024). Friedrich Merz was originally seen more as an Atlanticist than a European. Nevertheless, he has “no illusions” about Donald Trump’s America (Conesa, 2025).

 Ukraine had brought the West together. Today, it divides Europe and the United States

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to a NATO revival. “We stand together in unity and solidarity and reaffirm the enduring transatlantic bond between our nations”, the Allies hammered at the Madrid Summit of the Alliance in 2022.  The war also deepened Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States. On the eve and in the wake of the Russian invasion, the U.S. deployed an additional 14,000 troops to reassure European Allies, which brought the total number of U.S. troops in Europe to nearly 100,000 (Cooper, 2022).

Two years after, over the course of just a few days in February 2025, two of the worst European fears were confirmed. First, the Trump administration is pushing ahead with its idea of a U.S.-Russia deal to end the war in Ukraine. And all the signs are that Washington plans to leave Ukraine and the EU out of any negotiations and to their own devices when it comes to post-ceasefire security arrangements (Wolff, 2025).

After having devoted 150 billion euros into Ukraine’s defense, losing access to cheap Russian gas and tens of billions of investment opportunities in Russia, the Europeans are now excluded from the peace negotiations and called upon to assume responsibility for security guarantees beyond their reach, as well as for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, estimated at more than 500 billion euros (World Bank, 2025). Europe must prepare for the possibility that for the first time since World War II, it will be the principal party tasked with ending a major conflict on the continent. The Europeans, if they were to decide to engage militarily in Ukraine within the framework of “security guarantees” after a ceasefire, would do so outside Article 5, as U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth made clear, i.e. at their own risk and peril, without American cover. Which means that such guarantees, whatever is claimed here or there, are unlikely to see daylight.[2]

“Europe’s era is over”, former Russian President and Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, triumphally said; "It is weak, ugly and useless," Medvedev  wrote (Tass, 2025).

 Trump’s ‘after-shock’: a catalyst for European strategic autonomy?

Emmanuelle Blanc (School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Israel) argues that Trump’s provocative rhetoric and behaviour – violating key international norms upheld by the EU – have catalyzed a policy shift at the EU level by triggering an emotional game of misrecognition involving the emotion of contempt. Trump’s contemptuous foreign policy has urged the EU to reaffirm its identity confidently, thereby promising a more active and autonomous international role (Blanc, 2024, 686).

The election of Mr. Trump and his first decisions have played such an accelerating role. As Elie Tenenbaum, Director, Security Studies Center and Research Fellow, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), assesses, Trump’s comeback has been viewed as validating the original French perspective on EU’s strategic autonomy – a sort of "I told you so" sentiment (Tenenbaum, 2024, 13).

The narrative rapidly changed. Friedrich Merz, the future German chancellor, spoke about ‘independence from the U.S.’, a ‘taboo’ word until then reserved for France; Germany’s Bundestag voted to reform the ‘debt brake’ ("Schuldenbremse"), paving the way for a landmark spending bill in the defense sector. “Europe urgently needs to take more responsibility for its security”, Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski immediately tweeted on 6 November 2024 after Trump’s victory (also see Gyori, 2024). The need to support European preference is now generally admitted, included in the UK. Right after Hegseth’s announcement in Brussels, the European response was swift and, at least on paper, decisive. The Weimar+ group (Germany, France, Poland + Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the EU’s diplomatic service and the European Commission) issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to enhanced support in defense of Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity (Weimar+, 2025).

On 22 January, High-Representative Kaja Kallas launched a vibrant call to invest in European defense to counter Russia which “In three months (…) can produce more weapons and more ammunition than we can in twelve”, she said (EEAS, 2025). On 29 January, the Commission presented its Competitiveness Compass, which builds on the Draghi Report and translates it into action (EU Commission, 2025b & c). The special European Council on 6 March has been a decisive move towards a strong and more sovereign Europe of defense. The EU leaders welcomed the Commission’s  recommendation, through the ReArm Europe plan, to unleash the use of public funding in defence at national level and to activate the national escape clause of the stability and growth pact to facilitate such effort, as during the Covid crisis; this would make it possible to increase the member states’ spending by 1.5% of GNP, which could mobilise close to €800 billion. They took note of the Commission’s intention for a proposal to provide member states with €150 billion in defence loans, to invest “better and together” in air defense, artillery systems, missiles, munitions, UAVs and anti-drone defense systems, as well as to meet other needs in the cyber field and in military mobility. They welcomed the European Investment Bank’s plans to step up its support for Europe’s security and defence industry (European Council, 2025). Finally, on 19 March, the Commission and the High Representative presented a White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 with solutions to close critical capability gaps and build a strong defence industrial base. Based on these milestones, Brussels should be in a position to take key decisions before June. The EU can also make use of the “anti-coercion instrument” enabling it to unleash a battery of powerful, targeted countermeasures (restrictions on access to its public markets, intellectual property rights, investments, etc.), a dissuasive ‘bazooka’ testifying to the end of a certain naivety (EU Commission, 2023).

4. The EU needs political ambition

 By attacking European interests and humiliating our continent, Donald Trump is highlighting one of our greatest weaknesses: our inability to decide and act. Faced with repeated assaults from Donald Trump, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, Brussels’ room for manoeuver is tiny: it must protect its regulatory system, but it must also avoid giving the image of a skittish Europe compared to a a conquering and dynamic America.

What Europe needs is of course competitiveness, but above all political ambition. To have their say on the international stage, to be a “Shaping Power” in the military sense as well (Oosterveld & Torossian, 2018), Europeans need to speak with one voice and present a credible security offer. "Now would be a good time for European leaders to start thinking about where they are willing to lead and how they can help" (Smith, 2020). The EU must be guided by a clearer vision of the broader international order that flows from this inflection point. Amid growing authoritarianism and instability in the world, the Union finds itself at a crossroads in its approach to fostering peace and stability in its foreign policy. It has to decide: does it want to submit to the rules laid down by others, or define its own rules? Does it want to be a subject of international politics, or an object whose fate is decided by others?

European security is a much broader objective than defensive military effectiveness. It also concerns energy independence, connectivity, the autonomy of financial and economic structures, the resilience of infrastructure and social protection systems. Now more than ever, Europe needs to develop its own political, economic, military, industrial, and technological capabilities to be able to defend its interests in a world of great-power competition. Trump’s return should be the occasion for a qualitative leap in European security and defense integration.

Unfortunately, Elon Musk’s commitment in favor of the Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) did not elicit a clear response from the EU; neither did Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s call on U.S. to defend tech companies against European ‘censorship’, at his three-hour appearance on The Joe Rogan Experience podcast in January (Euractiv, 2025). The Commission does not seem to be willing to apply the same intransigence as it did to TikTok, whose interference led to the annulment of the Romanian presidential election in December 2024. EU’s hesitations to act or weakness could elicit the intervention of groups of member states driven by common interest.

5. New ‘coalitions of the willing’ in Europe

 New centres of power are emerging. Traditional formats, such as Franco-German or Franco-British, are no longer sufficient. On security issues, a multi-speed Europe seems unavoidable. Friedrich Merz said he supports a “concentric circles” idea of organizing Europe, in which some countries sit at the heart of integration while others commit to share less sovereignty while receiving fewer benefits from the single market (The Economist, 2025). New ‘coalitions of the willing’ or “supra-governmental avantgardes” (Riekeles, 2025; Zuleeg, Möller & Emmanouilidis, 2024) may emerge across old borders, such as Brexit-related divisions or rivalries between the EU and NATO. That is the case of the ambitious Multinational Force Ukraine (MFU) that France and the United Kingdom supervise with the aim to support the implementation of a full or partial ceasefire in Ukraine and deploy ‘reassurance forces’.

The current revival of the Weimar+ format (France, Germany, Poland, the UK and Italy) is much welcome. It might provide Trump with a much needed ‘face’ as well as a ‘center of gravity’ in Europe which is currently missing. With Poland, Merz intends to sign the equivalent of the Elysée Treaty, which has sealed Franco-German cooperation since 1963 and symbolizes the friendship between the two states (Benakis, 2025). He also shows readiness to settle the issue of reparations claimed by Warsaw for damage caused during the Second World War, which is poisoning relations between the two countries.  France also got much closer to Poland, with Macron and his Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu travelling to Warsaw. Paris and Warsaw are in the process of renegotiating a cooperation agreement, which should take the form of a treaty signed in Spring 2025.

A new pan-European collaboration extended to the UK, Norway and Iceland, and a common European defense market at 30+ would be the natural outcome of the process which has begun and could bring more security and competitiveness to Europe (Letta, 2025). The meeting of the 37 defense chiefs or their representatives convened alongside General Burkhard, French Chief of the Defense Staff, and his UK counterpart Admiral Radakin, to discuss a range of options together that could offer the best security guarantees for lasting peace, starting with a strong Ukrainian army, was considered as an ‘embryo’ of a kind of intergovernmental security council, which could eventually be at the forefront of a Europe of defense (Ricard & Jacqué, 2025).

Having the UK back on board is good news. Among the positive side-effects of Trump’s return is the end of the acute phase of tensions between the UK and the EU and the start of a new phase of fruitful collaboration. London has understood that it must not leave Europe when it comes to strategy and defense. Although the Labour government has no plans to revisit Brexit, London could commit to a ‘reset’ of its relationship with the 27, as prime Minister Starmer called it (Frennhoff Larsén, 2025) and show greater willingness and flexibility. Starmer joined the informal European council meeting on 3rd of February 2025, a première since the Brexit. The question is whether the Trump administration will let this ‘rapprochement’ happen. The famous ‘Project 2025’ report, which paved the way for the 2025 ‘presidential transition’  suggests to prevent the UK from slipping “back into the orbit of the EU” (Dans & Groves, 2023, 188). London may be forced to choose between the two sides of the Atlantic.

6. Europe cannot afford disunity and chaos

 The situation is so serious that Europe cannot afford internal quarrels over its security. However, Europeans will struggle to find internal unity. Unanticipated, the prospect of losing American protection is potentially devastating for the unity of Europe. From now on, the security of the continent depends essentially on Europeans themselves, and their ability to maintain cohesion.

Dividing Europeans surely is in Donald Trump’s strategy. The Project 2025 report was unambiguous about the need for a new conservative U.S. administration to “develop new allies” inside the EU – “especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU” (Dans & Groves, 2023, 188). Perfectly aware of the European ‘kaleidoscope’, the new administration will not hesitate to press the finger where it hurts, in every capital, hoping to divide the Twenty-Seven. Some member states might find themselves caught in the “who is not with me is against me” kind of blackmail, be it on the alignment of Europe with U.S. China policy, the increased purchase of U.S. industrial and military capabilities, or an approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict aligned with that of Mr. Netanyahu. Separate transactions, at the bilateral level, could become very costly for Europe (Quencez, 2024).

Among Europeans, new players might fight for leadership or at least influence, and engage in ‘solo’ approaches. Friedrich Merz intends to take on a “leadership” role in Europe, which would go beyond his function as chancellor, in the tradition of Helmut Kohl or Angela Merkel (Marsh & Rinke, 2025). Giorgia Meloni, the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, might play a constructive role in the new diplomatic relationship between the EU and the USA, but this could turn into subordination, as Romano Prodi, Meloni’s predecessor and former President of the EU Commission, warned, highlighting that Trump only engages with "entirely obedient" right-wing governments (Sky TG24, 2025). “Rome must further examine national and European implications before playing a transatlantic game.” (Darnis, 2025). Italy’s backing of the Weimar+ statement on 12 February 2025 reaffirming the signatories’ support for Ukraine is good news. But, so far, Italy does not seem to be willing to act as a link between Brussels and Washington within the EU framework. As for Viktor Orbán of Hungary, he considers the president-elect a ‘brother in arms’. Unsurprisingly, Orbán, issued a scathing condemnation of the Weimar+ statement as a “sad testament of bad Brusselian leadership” (X post, 12 Feb. 2025).

7. The EU vs. the Rest?

The debate about Europe’s decline is not new. Russia’s aggression has shaken previous Western assumptions about building a rules-based world order. The façade of a revival of U.S. leadership and Western unity in global affairs triggered by the war in Ukraine is now left in tatters. The Euro-Atlantic region is no longer the geopolitical center. A poll published in 2023 by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that, for 61 per cent of people in Russia, 61 per cent in China, 51 per cent in Türkiye, and 48 per cent in India, the future world order will be defined either by multipolarity or Chinese (or other non-Western) dominance (Garton Ash, Krastev & Leonard, 2023).

T. Garton Ash, I. Krastev and Mark Leonard evidence that Europeans are almost alone in mourning Trump’s election (Garton Ash, Krastev & Leonard, 2025). Europeans are on their own, threatened in the east and abandoned in the west. Trump.2 accelerates the ‘de-Westernisation’ of the world. It marks the beginning of a ‘post-American era’ (Zakaria, 2022), the transition from a hegemonic, Western-dominated world to a much more pluralistic and “decentered architecture of order management”, featuring old and new powers, with a greater role for regional governance (Acharya, 2014 & 2019).

In this post-Western world, the EU needs to step-up as a global superpower and overcome its crisis of confidence. Surprinsingly, converging voices from China and the ‘Global South’ are calling for the such a role: it is the main takeaway from the workshop on ‘Global implications of the war in Ukraine and challenges for a new security order’ in which the author of this paper participated at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB) on 24-25 April 2025.

8. Europe, still a peace project?

From an historical focus on peace and economic integration (“The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”, Art. 3 of the TEU), the EU has been dragged towards a more security-focused approach to crises (the “Borrell doctrine” and the “language of power”). The EU “has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, because we are the best in this field.” (EUGS, 2016, Foreword). But the adoption of the 2016 Global Strategy accelerated a pre-existing trend of securitization in the EU’s foreign policy and crisis response. A series of shockwaves brought the EU to a more assertive stance: the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in 2015 and its 2021 aftershock, when Belarus instrumentalized migration to put pressure on the EU’s eastern border; and Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The difference of tone between the EUGS and the 2022 Strategic Compass is perceptible.

The European Union is not a military power. It was born out of the ashes and bloody confrontations of the two world wars on its soil; to the extent that the EU budget cannot finance any expenditure that implies military or defence operations (Article 41(2) TEU), a restriction that could only be alleviated through the European Peace Facility (EPF) which allowed the EU, between 2022 and 2024, to mobilise €6.1 billion to address Ukraine’s pressing military and defence needs. Therefore, hearing from EU Commission President: “we are in an era of rearmament. And Europe is ready to massively boost its defence spending” (Von der Leyen, 2025) is quite a change in EU’s DNA. That’s probably why the authors of the March 2025 White Paper felt the need, in the conclusion, to reassess that “The EU is and remains a peace project”.

9. Two remarks for Austria

• While defending budgetary orthodoxy, Austria should carefully navigate this new ‘wind’ of strategic autonomy blowing over Europe. Among the 27 member states, the lines are moving on formerly controversial issues such as joint indebtedness and mutualization to boost European defense. Denmark and Finland, formerly members of the “frugal” clan, said they are now open to the idea. The smooth reform of the Schuldenbremse in Germany confirms that Germany is now in favor of taking on more debt (59% of the German population, according to a poll commissioned by the media ARD – Riesewick, 2025).
• The reshuffling of alliances in Europe, the return of UK and the impulse provided by the Weimar+ format might represent a risk for Austria. As neutral, ‘frugal’ and sometimes perceived unadapted for the current quantum leap, there is a risk that Austria stays on the external circle. Austria could use its privileged relationship with Merz’s Germany, which could act as a spokesperson for the smaller European countries particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

The Transatlantic framework can no longer be the only horizon for the Old Continent. Without abandoning its traditional partnerships, it must reinvent itself to meet the challenges of an increasingly fragmented world. “The big challenge for Europeans is therefore to find their own place in a more à la carte, zero-sum world” (Garton Ash, Krastev & Leonard, 2025). Europe must courageously redefine its relationship with the United States, which can be seen as a partner on certain issues, but no longer as a reliable ally. Europeans need to design a post-American Europe, and Ukraine will be their first test.

Will Donald Trump ultimately do Europe a favor (Karnitschnig, 2024)? Or are we the generation that will see Europe collapse? There is general agreement that the U.S.’s geopolitical shock therapy is a sign of a new world order. While European powers nominally recognize this, their policies are not, in practice, tailored towards such a change. For the time being, the Europeans lack firmness. Myopic or naive, Europeans are still hoping to team up with an American administration that has no friends, let alone allies. Their tone remains conciliatory and diplomatic, as if they were not dealing with the biggest crisis in transatlantic relations since the end of the Second World War. If Europe does not assert itself in this crisis, it risks the final blow to the idea of the EU becoming a global player.

[1] AUKUS (for Australia, the UK and the U.S.) is a trilateral security partnership between the three countries, intended to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Abruptly announced in 2021 without any coordination with the EU member states, it led to Australia’s controversial cancellation of a French-Australian submarine contract worth €56 billion, which caused a real trauma in France and triggered Paris to recall its ambassador in Australia and the U.S.

[2] “(…) Any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops. If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission. And they should not covered under Article 5.  There also must be robust international oversight of the line of contact. To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine.” (Opening Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at Ukraine Defense Contact Group, 12 Feb. 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/4064113/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact/).

 

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