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China’s Energy Security – Turning to Russia After Hormuz?

Policy Analysis 4/2026
By Thomas Eder
DOI: https://doi.org/10.83003/pa_4_26

Executive Summary:

China’s emphasis on domestic sources, the green transition, and oil & gas import diversification prevents Russia from capitalizing on the Strait of Hormuz closure. With overall demand in China projected to peak in 2027 (oil) and 2035 (gas), Russia’s window of opportunity may be closing. Drafting its military budget, Russia can expect steady energy export revenues from China but no major growth.

Key Insights:

China’s payments for Russian energy will not change much

The US-Iran War has not caused Chinese energy debates to favour much greater reliance on overland pipeline imports, and only an (unlikely) US-China war would. China still prizes diversification, Russia is already its top oil and gas supplier, and much larger annual purchases are unlikely. China values its strategic partner Russia and is also unlikely to reduce transfers.

Beijing’s focus remains on domestic sources and green transition

Chinese government and expert debates prioritize accelerating the green transition, advancing domestic oil & gas and nuclear energy, and maintaining coal as a strategic energy safety net.

China has many willing partners and still bets on maritime imports

China remains committed to diversified imports, maritime imports, imports from emerging partners in Latin America and Africa. It wants overland imports to grow, but has Central Asian alternatives to Russia, and patiently exploits its leverage over eager suppliers.

The EU could further complicate Russian exports to China

Russia will continue to heavily rely on shipping for oil and gas exports to China. Lowering the oil price cap for Russian exports to 30 USD with stricter enforcement and bolder action against “shadow tankers” could reduce Russian revenues. Ending EU imports can further reduce Russian leverage and incentivize China to wait for a better price.

Zusammenfassung:

Chinas Fokus auf seine eigenen Ressourcen, die Energiewende, und die Diversifizierung seiner Öl- und Gasimporte verhindert, dass Russland von einer Sperrung der Straße von Hormus profitieren kann. Da die Nachfrage in China voraussichtlich 2027 (Öl) und 2035 (Gas) ihren Höhepunkt erreichen wird, könnte sich ein Fenster der Möglichkeiten für Russland schließen. Bei der Aufstellung seines Militärhaushalts kann Russland zwar mit stabilen, aber nicht mit deutlich steigenden Einnahmen aus Energieexporten nach China rechnen.

Wesentliche Erkenntnisse:

Chinas Zahlungen für russische Energie bleiben weitgehend stabil

Der US-Iran-Krieg hat in China keine Debatten ausgelöst, die eine deutlich stärkere Abhängigkeit von Pipeline-Importen über Land befürworten – nur ein (unwahrscheinlicher) US-chinesischer Krieg würde dies bewirken. China setzt weiterhin auf Diversifizierung, und Russland ist bereits sein wichtigster Öl- und Gaslieferant. Deutlich höhere jährliche Käufe sind unwahrscheinlich. China schätzt Russland als strategischen Partner und wird voraussichtlich auch keine Transferkürzungen vornehmen.

Beijing setzt auf seine eigenen Energieressourcen und die grüne Wende

In chinesischen Regierungs- und Expertenkreisen steht die Beschleunigung der grünen Energiewende im Mittelpunkt, ebenso wie die Förderung inländischer Öl-, Gas- und Kernenergieprojekte sowie die Beibehaltung von Kohle als strategische Reserve.

China hat viele bereitwillige Partner und setzt weiterhin auf maritime Importe

China bleibt bei diversifizierten Importen, insbesondere Seeimporten, sowie bei Lieferungen aus aufstrebenden Partnern in Lateinamerika und Afrika. Zwar will es die Landimporte ausbauen, verfügt aber über zentralasiatische Alternativen zu Russland und nutzt geduldig seinen Verhandlungsvorteil gegenüber eifrigen Lieferanten.

Die EU könnte russische Exporte nach China weiter erschweren

Russland wird weiterhin stark auf den Seeweg für seine Öl- und Gasexporte nach China angewiesen sein. Eine Senkung der Preisobergrenze für russische Ölexporte auf 30 USD mit strengerer Durchsetzung und entschlossenerem Vorgehen gegen „Schatten-Tanker“ könnte die russischen Einnahmen verringern. Ein Stopp der EU-Importe könnte den russischen Verhandlungsspielraum weiter einengen und China dazu bewegen, auf günstigere Preise zu warten.

Keywords: China, energy, security, Russia, Iran

Authors:

Dr. Thomas Eder is a Research Fellow at the oiip, with a focus on China’s foreign, security and international law policy. He has published widely on China-Russia relations including in Foreign Affairs and a monography focused on energy (China-Russia Relations in Central Asia, Springer 2014). He teaches at the University of Vienna and previously worked at MERICS (Mercator Institute for China Studies) in Berlin and the Austrian Foreign Ministry. He studied at the University of Vienna, Peking University and the University of Hong Kong.

Karla Heltriegel interned at the oiip in 2026. She holds a BA degree in International Relations & International Organizations from the University of Groningen and spent an exchange semester at Fudan University in Shanghai.

Shi-cheng Ho interned at the oiip in 2026. He is pursuing an MA degree in Political Science at the University of Vienna, and his research is currently focused on the strategic implications of the semiconductor industry for international relations.

Kateryna Krasina interned at the oiip in 2026. She is pursuing an MA degree in Public Administration at the Central European University in Vienna, and her research interests focus on European security, Russia and China.

‘能源的饭碗必须端在自己手里。’

[We must hold the energy rice bowl firmly in our own hands.]

Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC (CCTV 2021)

Introduction

China has put heavy emphasis on energy self-reliance, import diversification and energy security since it became a net importer of oil in 1993 (Eder 2014). The People’s Republic’s 15^th Five-Year Plan published in March 2026 once again displays a dual focus on energy security and reducing emissions in its energy-related sub-chapters (IISS 2026; Xinhua 2026). The Chinese leadership’s approach combines yet another call to accelerate both 1) the green transition via conservation, efficiency and renewable energy, and 2) broader energy self-sufficiency including through increased domestic gas, stable oil and only gradually reduced coal production, as well as expanded strategic oil, gas and coal reserves. Potential threats to energy imports are widely discussed and partly drive this strategy.

The US-Israel-Iran War, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, and the counter-blockade of all Iranian ports by the US in spring 2026 present a new challenge to China’s energy security. About 12% of China’s oil imports in 2025 came from Iran, while major purchases from Gulf Arab states meant that about half of China’s oil and 15% of its natural gas imports transited the Strait of Hormuz (Reuters 2026b). This comes on top of the US Navy blocking Venezuelan exports to China, which had accounted for about 3% of China’s oil imports in 2025. With a view to US sanctions, China’s customs statistics did not report oil imports from Iran since 2022 and only noted minimal flows from Venezuela. China opted to instead use inter alia ship-to-ship transfers to rebrand such supplies as (mostly) Malaysian and Indonesian (Downs 2026b). The Chinese government, as others around the world, has become more acutely aware of vulnerabilities connected to chokepoints for maritime energy trade.

An important question for Europe’s security is whether, to which degree and when China will increase purchases of Russian energy following the Strait of Hormuz crisis. China’s leadership could choose to buy more from Russia to 1) focus on overland supplies that avoid potential US Navy interference, or to 2) purchase shipped supplies from Arctic or Russian Far Eastern ports where there is no need to transit maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or such straits in Southeast Asia. Due to Russia’s heavy dependence on energy export revenues for its state budget, this would have a major impact on the kind of military Russia will be able to finance and how quickly it may field its new force.

China has already been the main buyer for Russian energy since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (CREA 2026). However, it has not been willing or able to buy as much in volumes, nor pay the same level of prices, as European countries used to before the invasion. As a result, Russia has lost much more in monthly export revenues to the EU than it gained in monthly export revenues to China (Eurostat 2026; General Administration of Customs PRC 2026). China’s gas imports from Russia in 2025 in fact remained below the EU’s (IEA 2026a), and its past increases in imports of Russian coal and gas can still be described as advancing diversification efforts (Caruso and Rühlig 2025). Growing Russian exports to India and Türkiye have only helped make up some of Moscow’s losses (CREA 2026). Russia’s failure to fully replace Europe has been weighing on its budget and economic development, leading to the question of whether China will go much further to change that.

This policy analysis will first explain China’s energy supply security strategy. It will then draw on economic data, government policy documents, and expert debates from both the side of the buyer (i.e. China) and different sellers (i.e. Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) to discuss likely trajectories of overland oil and gas imports into China. The concluding section will address likely Chinese contributions to the Russian budget as well as implications for the EU and provide recommendations.

Everything, everywhere all at once – China’s energy supply diversification

The first focus of China’s energy supply security strategy is domestic sources, and none has been more prominent than coal. The country relied on its abundant domestic reserves to power the initial decades of relentless economic growth after the economy was opened post-1978. In the 2000s, coal power accounted for more than 70% of electricity generation (EIA 2022), before the government opted for a gradual reduction due to environmental damage and health risks. Coal’s share fell to 50-60% by the end of the 2010s, but then stabilized, partly in reaction to a domestic energy crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021 that involved several blackouts (CREA 2025; CSIS 2025). Coal power plants are still coming online, being built, and being planned. Coal remains a back-up for expanding domestic renewables and imported oil and gas, a safety net, indeed still a backbone of energy security. A considerable share of China’s coal power generating capacity stands idle, and production could be ramped up if needed in a crisis (Qin and Myllyvirta 2025). While China does import some coal, sources are diversified, and the imported share is not high.

The second focus of China’s energy supply security strategy is the green transition and shift to an “electro-state”. Around 2010, China started to rapidly expand non-fossil energy production. First with enormous hydropower dams and nuclear reactors. While the aggressive growth in nuclear and hydropower continues, the starkest recent change has been the relentless rise of wind and solar power (PIIE 2025). China is already the top producer globally of hydropower, wind power, solar power and electricity from biofuels (IEA 2025). Low-carbon sources now account for more than 40% of electricity generation: about 14% hydro, 11% wind, 11% solar, 5% nuclear, and 2% biofuels (LowCarbonPower 2026). Solar has reached cost parity with coal and is expected to cover a larger share of energy supply despite subsidies being phased out (Reuters 2026a). China is scaling up offshore wind power (SCIO 2026), building the world’s largest hydroelectric power station in Tibet (Davidson 2025), and is on course to be the largest global producer of nuclear energy by 2030 (Nakano and Yeh 2026; World Nuclear Association 2026). Another aspect of China’s shift to an “electro-state” is about 55% of new car sales and 25% of new truck sales in 2025 being electric (IEA 2026; Ma 2026), whereas every tenth car in China and most two-wheelers are already electric.

The third focus of China’s energy supply security strategy is domestic oil and gas production. China has ramped up domestic gas production by about a third since 2020 (Bousso 2025) and ranks as global number four producer (IEA 2026b) likely to soon overtake Iran for the third spot behind the US and Russia. China has benefited from the shale gas revolution and other new unconventional methods in covering about 60% of its own gas demand (IEA 2026a) and its demand is expected to peak around 2035 (Howe and Li 2025). Meanwhile, offshore production, shale oil, and unconventional “tertiary recovery” methods to maximize oil field output, have allowed China to hold oil production steady and cover almost 30% of its needs. It currently ranks sixth among oil producers worldwide. Both its oil production and demand are expected to plateau and peak between 2026 and 2030 (Chen and Li 2026; IEA 2026c). Both the strength of domestic production and expected consumption peaks in the not-too-distant future entail further limits to China’s oil and gas import needs.

The fourth focus of China’s energy supply security strategy is diversified imports. It has aimed for no supplier to account for more than 15-20% of its oil or gas imports, and to balance predominant maritime with overland supplies. Its main oil suppliers in 2025 were Russia (18%, including via pipeline), Saudi Arabia (14%), Iran (likely 11-12%, recorded as e.g. Malaysian oil due to Western sanctions), Iraq (11%), Brazil (8%), UAE (7%), Oman (6%), Angola (5%), Kuwait (3%), Canada (3%), Venezuela (likely 3%, recorded as e.g. Malaysian oil), and Kazakhstan (1-2%, all via pipeline) (Downs 2026a; EIA 2025). China’s main gas and LNG suppliers in 2024 were Russia (22%, including via pipeline), Australia (20%), Turkmenistan (19%, all via pipeline), Qatar (14%), Malaysia (6%), US (3%), and Indonesia (3%) (Bousso 2025; Downs 2026a; EIA 2025). Pipelines from Russia to China were only built starting in the 2010s (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, Power of Siberia gas pipeline). Those from Central Asian suppliers Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan were already built starting in the 2000s (Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, Central Asia-China gas pipeline network).

As a result of China’s above strategy, flexible purchases of discounted exports, and political imperatives of supporting a key partner, China transferred large sums for Russian energy exports during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. From 2022 to 2025, volumes of Russian oil imported by China have risen from 86 million metric tons to 101 million metric tons; LNG volumes from 6.6 million tons to 9.9 million tons; pipeline gas volumes from 14.5 billion cubic meters to 38.8 billion cubic meters (MERICS 2026; Kalwasiński 2025). Meanwhile, oil prices and Russian discounts for China have varied. China’s annual payments for Russian oil supplies have hovered around 50-60bn USD, such for Russian gas have risen from around 11bn USD to more than 14bn USD, and such for Russian coal have fallen from more than 11bn USD to less than 8bn USD (Kalwasiński 2025). Accordingly, the Russian budget has been bolstered by a rough average of around 67.5bn USD of Chinese oil and gas purchases per year during Russia’s full-scale war. Annual coal purchases have accounted for an average of 9.5bn USD. The following sub-chapters will aim to address how the numbers for oil and gas may change in the short- to medium-term, including in light of the Strait of Hormuz closure and US Navy actions blocking Iranian and Venezuelan exports.

Against the background of China’s energy security strategy, energy mix and past purchases from Russia, the next sub-chapter will look at Chinese government and expert debates on whether the strategy should be adapted and what Russia’s role should be.

How much Russia do we need? – Chinese debates on energy demand & security

In accordance with China’s new five-year plan, China’s National Energy Administration focused its 2025 policy documents on energy security, green transition, and maintaining economic growth (NEA 2025a). Domestic supply is to be prioritized as a key pillar of energy security, while international partnerships should be as diversified as possible. On natural gas, the institution announced continued expansion of pipeline infrastructure with Russia and Central Asian partners but also new LNG capacity to best suit diversification (NEA 2025b).

Despite the closure of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrating maritime chokepoint risks, Chinese expert debates up to May 2026 have not shifted towards a more pronounced emphasis on overland pipelines. Chinese scholars cite President Xi as saying that “we must hold the energy rice bowl firmly in our own hands” (Zhou 2026; Tan 2025; see also NEA 2022). China’s energy “safety net” of abundant coal power is still described as a key advantage, while coal could be further exploited for the chemical industry (Liao et al 2026; Qu 2026). Ongoing innovation and technological breakthroughs on domestic energy sources are to allow for more energy autonomy, including on so-called clean coal technologies, (ultra-)deep and unconventional terrestrial and offshore oil and gas exploration, nuclear energy advancements, as well as energy storage and smart grids. Accelerating the green transition, including the build-up of all types of renewable energy generation, electric vehicles and energy efficiency and energy-saving technologies (even such lifestyles), is portrayed as a necessary parallel step towards energy security (Liao et al 2026; Qu 2026; Zhang and Zhang 2026; Zhou 2026).

As far as oil and gas imports remain necessary, Chinese authors still favour diversification and expanded import channels to hedge against (geo-)political risks, and they still commit to (long-term) maritime imports as well as overland pipeline imports (Peng 2026 as cited in Mardell and de Garets Geddes 2026; Zhang and Zhang 2026; Zhou 2026). Maritime imports are attributed such importance that experts call to under no circumstances pay Iran for passage, because that would constitute a dangerous precedent, would undermine maritime norms and would imperil future maritime trade (Ye 2026 cited in Mardell 2026). In fact, while imports from the Middle East should be somewhat reduced (or rerouted through the Red Sea), some scholars explicitly advocate treating the share of African crude oil in China’s imports as the key metric for success in diversification (Peng 2026 as cited in Mardell and de Garets Geddes 2026). Others speculate about new prospects in Southeast Asia (Zhang Q. 2026), while Latin America comes into focus again (see also Zhang and Zhang 2026) as Brazil and Guyana ascend as energy exporters and Brazil already became an important partner to China.

At the same time, China’s scholars do also recommend increasing imports through overland pipelines (Peng 2026 as cited in Mardell and de Garets Geddes 2026; Qu 2026; Ye 2026). While exporters might have more leverage in the short term due to the Hormuz crisis, Chinese scholars expect demand-side countries, i.e. China, to reclaim bargaining power in the medium term as they redouble efforts on energy transition and diversification (Liao et al 2026). The implied recommendation is patience as China negotiates and is combined with calls to improve China’s position by building a sort-of “energy buyers-club” with other countries. Chinese authors also emphasize diversified overland imports, from Central Asia just as much as Russia (Peng 2026 as cited in Mardell and de Garets Geddes 2026; Qu 2026), which may mean that producers could be played against each other on pricing. Some experts caution on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline from Russia that it may help mitigate maritime supply risks, but also involves massive capital outlays, long-term commitments, a lack of flexibility, potentially complicated and costly transit arrangements with Mongolia, its own geopolitical risks, the political costs of closer relations with Russia, as well as potential dependence on a single supplier (Tan 2025).

In other words, China may want some more Russia in its energy mix, but enthusiasm is clearly limited. The next sub-chapter will zoom in on debates in Russia and other overland suppliers on how much they in turn would like to sell to China.

How much China in the mix? – Russian & Central Asian debates on opportunity and dependence

Building on their extensive hopes and expectations in the 2010s, Russian scholars debated since 2022 how China may come to replace the European market for Russian energy (Kashin 2022). This would include further expansion of Russian oil supplies and major upgrades to its gas exports towards China. The Chinese side paying a lower price was not necessarily viewed as a critical problem. Some authors cautioned, though, that the energy relationship matters more to Russia than China (Elnikova 2025), that there is no full strategic alignment (Morozov 2022), and that Russia’s response to excessive Chinese leverage should be diversification to other Asian buyers (Derkach, Galiguzov and Tsukanova 2025). However, as long as the current Russian leadership continues to pursue its war against Ukraine, such diversification plans are fanciful. While Moscow attempted in the 2000s to play Tokyo and Beijing against each other in order to maximize gains from energy export, both Japan and South Korea would now reject Russia’s overtures. India, Russia’s only other large energy partner in Asia, is looking to diversify its imports as US and EU sanctions impact its oil trade with Russia.

China’s much less discussed first major overland pipeline gas supplier is Turkmenistan. Line D of the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline Network offers an alternative option for increased supplies, and Beijing indeed already opted for expanded flows (Wishnick 2026). China National Petroleum Corporation started to expand production at the giant Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan (Caspian News 2026), and the country’s leader Berdimuhamedow announced together with Politburo Standing Committee Member Ding Xuexiang that this was key for constructing the Line D gas pipeline (Turkmenistan.gov 2026b). Turkmenistan might prefer to diversify as well, hasten construction of the TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) (Turkmanistan.gov 2026a) and potentially a trans-Caspian pipeline to Azerbaijan, but these are exceedingly difficult to realize. Building a pipeline through Afghanistan remains connected to both high costs and security risks, while bringing India and Pakistan together in the same project is fraught with potential for disputes. Meanwhile, it remains unclear who would finance trans-Caspian gas export, and whether Russia or Iran may seek to block it.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War may render an alternative overland pipeline oil supplier for China more relevant: Kazakhstan. The country’s oil exports overwhelmingly flow West through Russia via the “Caspian Pipeline Consortium”-route towards the EU (Omirgazy 2025). Ukraine has intensified strikes on Russian energy export infrastructure, including at the port of Novorossiysk, to deprive Moscow of resources for its military budget. Kazakhstan alleged that these strikes also damaged the “Caspian Pipeline Consortium”-terminal in Novorossiysk and less of its own oil could be exported this way. Kazakhstan also appeared to doubt the reliability of the Druzhba Pipeline through Russia, Belarus and Poland to Germany. Its energy minister strongly emphasized his country’s ability to redistribute volumes, including from the giant Kashagan field and including to China (Tenge 2026; Azattyq 2025). Current export volumes to China are small, but China’s already very strong position in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, continued investments and Astana’s explicit wish to diversify may converge in the medium-term. The existing Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, currently partly used for Russian transit, may carry larger volumes of Kazakh oil eastward.

To sum up, there are three overland suppliers eager to export more to China. Sometimes because it is the only (safe) option. Beijing has a lot of leverage and could draw out negotiations until it gets the most favourable deal. The next and concluding sub-chapter will analyse which likely Chinese contributions to the Russian budget all the above points to in the short-, medium- and long-term.

How much money for the Russian military budget? – Implications for European security & policy recommendations

China’s oil and gas demand are expected to peak in 2027 and 2035 respectively (Carbon Brief 2025; Howe and Li 2025). With China holding domestic oil production steady, imports can only be redistributed among suppliers but will not keep growing. Contributing to this trend are China’s slowing economic growth, as well as its astounding buildup in renewable and nuclear energy, electric vehicle use, and wider efforts in transitioning to a low carbon “electro-state”. Meanwhile, continuing growth in gas import demand will be limited by China further ramping up domestic production. Higher oil and gas prices may also lead China to further accelerate the shift towards renewables and electrification, and to rely on coal more heavily and for a longer time than previously assumed (Meidan 2026). China’s main conclusion from the Strait of Hormuz closure has been to shift to domestic sources more quickly. Different foreign oil and gas suppliers will be jockeying for a moderately growing market.

Chinese government policy documents and expert debates on oil and gas imports demonstrate confidence in the feasibility of maritime imports and a sustained commitment to diversification. A particular focus appears to be on (relatively) new and additional import partners, especially among African states, but also e.g. Brazil, a low-risk supplier whose production is growing (Downs 2026a) and Canada as a supplier of unsanctioned and cost competitive heavy crude (Argus 2025). After US President Trump’s visit to Beijing in May 2026, a resumption of US energy exports to China appeared plausible as well (Paul 2026).

Even if China should choose to emphasize overland imports, it finds several potential partners that are favourably inclined or have no other options. Turkmenistan’s government highlights ongoing preparatory work for Line D of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline network (additional capacity: 30 billion cubic meters), while the country still lacks other buyers and will likely offer a very competitive price. Members of Kazakhstan’s government stress their country’s capacity to reroute oil exports through the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline (capacity: 20 million metric tons), should transit through Russia towards the EU be no longer feasible due to infrastructure damage in the Russia-Ukraine War. Russian expert debates include a certain wariness about depending too much on China. While some may prefer Russia to rely more on other buyers in Asia, India is seeking import diversification away from Russia, and Japan and South Korea reject Moscow’s overtures. Russia is offering the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline (capacity: 55 billion cubic meters) to China, but Chinese scholars are concerned about construction costs, transit through Mongolia, the lack of flexibility and the risks connected to overreliance on Russia. Beijing may further draw out negotiations on pricing to make optimal use of its leverage, as EU sanctions foresee the end of gas imports from Russia in 2026 (LNG) and 2027 (pipeline) (von Essen & Andersson 2025). Russian oil already partially fills Kazakhstan’s pipeline to China, but no major upgrades to this or Russia’s own pipeline are even on the drawing board.

Under these conditions a drastic increase to China’s annual payments for Russian energy before 2030 is unlikely, unless there is an (imminent) war in the Western Pacific. China’s leadership appears to have grown comfortable with Russia as its leading oil and gas supplier reaching or (at least temporarily) somewhat exceeding a 20% share in China’s respective imports. This does not yet indicate that Beijing would be comfortable with a much higher share still nor that it would like to sustain such a situation once Russia no longer provides extensive discounts. In fact, import diversification remains a key focus. This approach may only change in preparation of or during a as of this writing unlikely war in the Taiwan Straits or South China Sea where the US Navy is (considered likely to get) involved. In the meantime, Chinese payments may rise with global price levels, shrinking discounts, and gradually expanded flows, but are unlikely to be in a different league than the 2022-2025 annual average of 67.5bn USD for oil and gas (77bn USD with coal). Even if the Power of Siberia 2-gas pipeline is eventually constructed, it is unlikely to come online and reach full capacity before the early to mid-2030s. And even then, overall Chinese payments for Russian energy could indeed remain rather close to current numbers, as such for gas could double while those for oil and coal are reduced in line with China’s transition to a low-carbon economy and domestic sources.

The EU and its member states can expect steady to slightly increased annual Chinese payments for Russian energy until 2030. China’s leadership remains committed to the strategic partnership with Russia, its key security and global governance partner in competition with the US and broader “West”. It will aim to help Russia avoid a deeper economic crisis and allow the Russian president or a successor with similar policy positions to stabilize political power throughout and after the war. Beijing also wants to retain Russia as an important building bloc in China’s energy security. European capitals should therefore plan with the assumption of the Chinese contribution to the Russian budget holding steady. China’s commitment has limits. However, as long as Russia remains able to also export energy to India and Türkiye, combined income for Russia’s military budget may be similar and sufficient to further prolong the war and broadly threaten Europe’s security. Meanwhile, China will continue to drive a hard bargain with Russia (and everyone else) even after the Strait of Hormuz closure and will likely secure cheaper oil and gas prices for its industries than Europe.

Further EU and member state measures could, however, complicate Russian oil and LNG exports to China. The EU, ideally in the framework of the G7 oil price cap coalition, could lower the oil price cap for Russian seaborne crude oil exports to 30 USD by the end of 2026 (i.e. after the markets have calmed down following the US-Israel-Iran War) (see also Wickenden and Levi 2026). This means that no EU (or G7+) company may provide maritime transport or related services (including insurance and financial) for such exports above the price cap level (European Commission 2026). EU insurers and traders being required to produce bank statements verifying Russian oil was traded below the price cap could help improve enforcement. Member states could further complicate Russian exports to China by tightening environmental and navigation laws in EU member state territorial waters. They could also enforce laws more boldly and frequently by boarding and detaining “shadow tankers” (unflagged, unregistered, posing a (environmental) security risk). Ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU (or G7+) waters could be banned (Wickenden and Levi 2026). Importantly, EU member states ending Russian energy imports in 2026/2027, incentivizes Beijing to wait for a better price and draw out some negotiations with Moscow.

The EU and its member states could also learn from China on strategic energy autonomy. Other major powers may intentionally or unintentionally cut Europe’s access to key resources, not only oil and gas, but critical raw materials broadly defined. Europe could learn from China to prepare even more for such situations, focus even more on domestic sources, accelerate the green transition, and diversify imports further to not rely on any (non-European Economic Area) supplier for more than 15-20% of imports. European strategic and commercial stockpiles often do not yet compare with China’s. Expansion of renewable energy production and a wider shift towards a low-carbon economy should be more clearly defined in terms of energy security. This should naturally include greater reliance on European resources, greater diversification of relevant imports, and more resilient supply chains. Growth in storage capacity and long-distance power transmission infrastructure can no longer lag. Continuing to include nuclear power and reducing oil and gas imports can allow for more domestic oil and gas production and somewhat prolonged use of coal while lowering emission levels. Maximizing production and processing in Europe can not only contribute to energy security but also work against the allegation of environmental damage being outsourced to developing countries.

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