What Hormuz Reveals About the Limits of China’s Strategic Patience
What Hormuz Reveals About the Limits of China’s Strategic Patience
What Hormuz Reveals About the Limits of China’s Strategic Patience
Commentary by Karla Heltriegel
September 2026
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the oiip.
About the author:
Karla Heltriegel was an intern at the oiip from March to June 2026. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and International Organizations from the University of Groningen, where she developed a strong interest in global political dynamics and transnational processes. During her undergraduate studies, she spent an exchange semester at Fudan University in Shanghai, where she advanced her Mandarin language skills and expanded her knowledge of China’s political, economic, and social systems.
On August 24, Washington intensified its efforts to economically isolate Iran, bringing Beijing’s strategic patience under more direct pressure. Strategic patience is commonly understood as a long-term approach in which Beijing avoids prematurely challenging U.S. primacy while gradually strengthening its diplomatic, economic, and military position, with the expectation that shifts in relative power will eventually allow China to assume a larger role (Cook, 2021). Hormuz, however, reveals the constraints of this long-term logic by confronting Beijing with immediate economic and security costs. The Trump administration launched “Operation Economic Outcast,” described as “Trump’s economic D-Day” against Iran, a package of sanctions aimed at cutting Iran off from the remaining international financial and oil networks, including those operating through China and Hong Kong (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 24 Aug. 2026; The Guardian, 30 Aug. 2026).
The package is particularly significant for Beijing because China remains by far the largest destination for Iranian crude, accounting for more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports (Reuters, 20 Aug. 2026; Kpler data cited by Reuters). Chinese firms and vessels have consequently become increasingly exposed to U.S. secondary sanctions as Washington attempts to restrict Tehran’s remaining sources of income (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 24 Aug. 2026; Reuters, 24 Aug. 2026). Hence, the tightening of sanctions is intensifying the economic pressure caused by the disruptions that have persisted for the past six months and the increasingly selective passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
Beijing responded by rejecting unilateral sanctions rather than publicly distancing itself from Tehran. The same balancing act was evident at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek in early September. As the ten-member group again condemned the military strikes against Iran, Xi Jinping avoided a formal bilateral meeting with President Masoud Pezeshkian, underscoring Beijing’s effort to preserve the strategic and economic benefits of its relationship with Tehran without becoming more deeply drawn into its confrontation with the U.S. (MERICS, 2026a). On August 25, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian rejected the sanctions as “illegal unilateral sanctions” and said China would take “all necessary measures” to protect its legitimate rights and interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Regular Press Conference, 25 Aug. 2026, BBC, 25 Aug. 2026). When Trump raised the possibility of further sanctions against Chinese institutions due to their ties to Iran later that week, Beijing again opposed unilateral sanctions and emphasized dialogue and diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Regular Press Conference, 28 Aug. 2026). Washington has since signalled that secondary sanctions will continue on a weekly basis, particularly against financial institutions, leaving the extent of China’s future exposure uncertain (Reuters, 30 Aug. 2026; Reuters, 1 Sept. 2026).
Six months of conflict around Hormuz have made this balancing act increasingly difficult to sustain. China wants to preserve its economic relationship with Iran, resist U.S. coercive pressure, and present itself as an alternative diplomatic and security actor. Yet Beijing’s dependence on stability in Hormuz leaves it with little appetite for escalation. Hormuz thus shows that strategic patience is also a way for Beijing to manage the vulnerabilities created by its own interdependence.
After all, for years Beijing has cultivated the image of a strategically patient power, rooted in a deeply institutionalized belief that the U.S. and the West are in relative decline, what Xi calls “great changes unseen in a century” (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2025). If
U.S. power is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, China can afford to wait while the balance of power gradually shifts in its favor. Beijing, however, seeks to do more than wait. It also aims to present itself as a more responsible security actor than Washington. Hormuz shows the difficulty of this posture. Waiting may signal a strategy of confidence, but it also is a way of managing exposure. China may benefit from U.S. overextension, yet energy dependence, vulnerable supply chains, and domestic economic stability limit how far it can exploit that opportunity.
Strategic Patience Under Pressure
Hormuz made this visible through energy prices and the cost of key industrial materials. As oil prices rose, Beijing intervened to soften fuel-price increases. But even with the cap, retail gasoline and diesel price caps remain around 14 and 15 percent above their pre-war levels, pushing costs onto drivers, logistics workers, and small businesses (Reuters, 31 July 2026). Higher fuel prices have already weakened domestic demand, with gasoline consumption still down 6.5 percent during the July peak travel season despite some recovery from the previous month (Reuters, 31 July 2026).
The pressure extends beyond consumer fuel. China’s exposure also runs through industrial materials: around 45 percent of its imported methanol and 10 percent of its polyethylene come from Iran, while 56 percent of its sulfur comes from the Middle East (IISS, May 2026). Rising costs for methanol and sulfur can feed into manufacturing and fertilizers, with wider effects on production and agriculture. China’s sulfuric acid export ban showed how quickly an external supply shock can trigger protective state intervention (IISS, May 2026).
This is why Hormuz matters. Against the background of weak consumer confidence, a prolonged property crisis, and youth employment pressure, energy shocks become political tests of the party-state’s ability to protect livelihoods and prevent cost pressures from becoming dissatisfaction. China’s patience should therefore be read through securitized interdependence. This is an outward posture of waiting shaped by external dependencies and their potential domestic consequences.
The point is not just that higher oil or input prices undermine China’s economy. It is that, under Beijing’s Comprehensive National Security (CNS) framework, such pressures are increasingly read as security risks (MERICS, 2022). CNS does not treat security as a narrow military issue, but as the protection of the party-state against instability in all its forms (MERICS, 2025a). It seeks to detect risks early, strengthen state control, and prevent external shocks from becoming domestic instability. This can make China more resilient, but also more interventionist and less predictable. As more policy areas are defined as security issues, ordinary economic or diplomatic problems can quickly be interpreted as threats to party-state security. In practice, this encourages protective state intervention, from price controls to targeted export restrictions, such as the Hormuz-linked export ban on sulfuric acid. These tools can cushion shocks in the short term, but they also blur the line between economic management and national security. Recent policy documents point in the same direction. China’s 2025 “National Security White Paper” presents China as a source of stability in a turbulent world, acknowledges domestic economic pressure, and doubles down on resilience, self-reliance, supply-chain security, and a stronger international security role (MERICS, 2025b). Its recent “Regulation on Industrial and Supply-Chain Security” makes the link even more explicit by tying supply-chain resilience directly to national security (MERICS, 2026b). This demonstrates Beijing’s attempt to govern interdependence as a security risk.
Security Without Guarantees
Externally, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) translates China’s domestic security logic into an international role (MERICS, 2022). Rather than aiming to replace the UN, the GSI seeks to reinterpret multilateral security from within by embedding Chinese ideas into UN language and institutions. It thus marks a shift from presenting China mainly as a development and infrastructure actor to claiming a larger role in global security governance. The GSI is also ideological. It frames sovereignty, regime stability, non-interference, and anti-hegemonism as the basis of a more legitimate security order, while criticizing the U.S.-led alliances, sanctions, and intervention. Strategic patience, in this sense, also means gradually building a security framework more aligned with Chinese preferences against the backdrop of perceived U.S. decline.
Yet Hormuz shows the limits of this approach. Beijing can shape diplomatic language and institutional debate, but the GSI allows it to do so without taking on binding security commitments. This is possible because the GSI remains deliberately flexible and light on binding obligations. China can call for restraint, offer mediation, and promote dialogue without committing itself to military guarantees. This is crucial for Hormuz. China depends on stable maritime energy flows and a stable global economy, but it does not want to become the actor escorting tankers, enforcing safe passage, or confronting state actors in the Gulf. Such a role would expose Beijing to military escalation and threaten its wider regional and economic ties. By thus treating vulnerability as national security, Beijing makes more shocks politically sensitive. In sovereignty-related cases such as Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit, this can encourage coercive overreaction. In Hormuz, however, it encourages caution, because escalation could feed back into domestic pressures.
Djibouti offers an insightful contrast. Located beside the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, it sits along another vulnerable sea lane, and has become a key site for protecting shipping and commercial interests along a corridor increasingly affected by regional instability (Chatham House, 2022). Here, Beijing has been willing to build overseas security capacity for relatively bounded missions. Its Djibouti logistics facility, Beijing’s closest overseas military foothold to the Middle East, gives the People’s Liberation Army reach near key sea lanes and supports anti-piracy operations and the protection of Chinese citizens and assets abroad (Chatham House, Mar. 2024). Yet these remain limited forms of security provision, largely directed at non-state threats. Hormuz is different. Guaranteeing tanker passage during a war involving Iran, Israel, and the U.S. would require China to confront state actors, accept escalation risks, and assume responsibility for regional maritime security. This is the line Beijing has so far avoided crossing. Therefore, the limit lies not in overseas engagement per se, but in the risks of escalation associated with confrontation between state actors. At this point, strategic patience becomes constrained patience, because crossing this threshold would create the very risks Beijing’s patience is meant to contain.
Rather than resolving these vulnerabilities through security provision, Beijing has therefore sought to reduce its exposure wherever possible. This has included building significant energy reserves and diversifying supply routes and suppliers. Measures that, while providing China with a buffer, do not grant it autonomy, since by shifting away from Middle Eastern supplies China remains dependent on external suppliers. Sinopec, for example, sharply increased purchases of Russian Far Eastern crude to compensate for diminished Middle Eastern supplies (Reuters, 6 Aug. 2026; Eder, 2026). At the same time, Iran remains an attractive source of low-cost oil for Chinese buyers, much like Venezuela before it. Yet the sanctions that create these price discounts also make purchasing and transporting Iranian crude more difficult. Some independent Chinese refiners have therefore supplemented Iranian supplies with crude from countries such as Brazil and Iraq (Reuters, 21 Aug. 2026). Passage through Hormuz has remained possible but increasingly selective, while widespread Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder shutdowns make the true scale of traffic difficult to assess (Lloyd’s List, 18 Aug. 2026; Reuters, 1 Sept. 2026).
The behavior of vessels with ties to China during the conflict illustrates how this broader adaptation strategy also had an impact at sea. Several vessels with ties to China transited the Strait of Hormuz while explicitly declaring their Chinese identity, suggesting that commercial actors were testing whether political ties to Tehran might facilitate their passage. However, major Chinese tanker operators remained cautious, while several ships with ties to COSCO reportedly abandoned their attempts to transit after failing to obtain transit permits (Lloyd’s List, 9 Mar. 2026). A Chinese-owned feeder vessel later reportedly paid Iran for passage through its informal safe corridor (Lloyd’s List, 23 Mar. 2026). These cases show how China is adapting to the insecurity in the Strait without resolving it. Political ties to Tehran may facilitate selective access, but they do not amount to a reliable system of maritime security.
However, the extent to which China can mitigate this risk depends on whether alternative routes are actually available. In container shipping, geographic substitution is possible, at least to some extent. For instance, on August 15, Sea Legend launched a regular China–Europe container service through the Northern Sea Route (The Guardian, 17 Aug. 2026). The company has presented the route as a “third corridor” for China–Europe trade that can strengthen supply-chain resilience amid a more uncertain international environment, while recent reporting links its growing appeal directly to instability along traditional Middle Eastern shipping routes (Caixin, 25 Oct. 2025; South China Morning Post, 18 Aug. 2026). The Arctic route therefore offers a way to reduce risk by limiting China’s exposure to disruptions in container traffic from Europe through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, even though it does not reduce China’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for energy supplies from the Gulf region.
Taken together, these cases point to the same underlying dilemma. Hormuz shows how external instability can threaten China’s domestic security priorities through energy prices, supply chains, and economic confidence. Djibouti, meanwhile, shows the limits of China’s willingness to provide security beyond its borders. It can protect selected interests and maintain a limited security presence, but it has stopped well short of replacing the U.S. as a regional security provider. Where possible, China also seeks to reduce exposure through diversification and alternative trade routes, as the Arctic shipping example suggests, yet such rerouting cannot resolve its dependence on Gulf energy flows through Hormuz. China therefore remains in a delicate situation. It is striving to reshape the U.S.-led security order, yet continues to rely on the stability that this order provides, and is not taking on commitments that could pose new risks within its own borders.
Strategic patience should therefore be understood less as simple confidence or restraint than as risk management under conditions of interdependence. China may benefit from U.S. overextension and a gradual redistribution of global power, but Hormuz demonstrates that it cannot simply wait out instability when that instability feeds back into its own economy and domestic security. The same logic that encourages Beijing to shield itself from external shocks also constrains the credibility of its international security ambitions. What emerges is a persistent gap between China’s growing ability to shape global security debates and its willingness to provide the guarantees on which regional order still depends.
References
Aikman, Ian. 2026. China Hits Out at ‘Illegal’ New US Sanctions on Iran and Trading Partners. BBC News, 25 August 2026. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyl8965j5go
Chatham House. 2022. The Response to Debt Distress in Africa and the Role of China: Case Studies of Chinese Lending to Africa. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/12/response-debt-distress-africa-and-role-china/02-case-studies-chinese-lending-africa
Chatham House. 2024. Is China Eyeing a Second Military Base in Africa as the US Struggles to Maintain One in Niger? March 2024. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/03/china-eyeing-second-military-base-africa-us-struggle s-maintain-one-niger
Caixin. 2025. 北极航道再破冰 [Breaking the Ice Again on the Arctic Route]. 25 October 2025. https://weekly.caixin.com/2025-10-25/102375525.html
Cook, Steven A. 2021. Major Power Rivalry in the Middle East. Council on Foreign Relations, Discussion Paper, March 2021. https://www.cfr.org/reports/major-power-rivalry-middle-east
Eder, Thomas. 2026. China’s Energy Security – Turning to Russia After Hormuz? Policy Analysis 4/2026. Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip). DOI: 10.83003/pa_4_26. https://www.oiip.ac.at/publikation/chinas-energy-security-turning-to-russia-after-hormuz/
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 2026. China and the War in Iran: Pragmatism and National Resilience. May 2026. https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/charting-china/2026/05/china-and-the-war-in-iran-pragm atism-and-national-resilience/
Lloyd’s List. 2026. More Chinese-linked Vessels Broadcast Identity to Transit Hormuz, but Tankers Stay Away. 9 March 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156556/More-Chineselinked-vessels-broadcast-identity-to-tra nsit-Hormuz-but-tankers-stay-away
Lloyd’s List. 2026. Chinese Boxship Pays Iran for Hormuz Passage as Corridor Traffic Grows. 23 March 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1156689/Chinese-boxship-pays-Iran-for-Hormuz-passage-as-c orridor-traffic-grows
Lloyd’s List. 2026. Hormuz Traffic Holds Firm as Attacks Intensify and Diplomacy Collapses. 18 August 2026. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1158225/Hormuz-traffic-holds-firm-as-attacks-intensify-and-di plomacy-collapses
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2026a. “SCO Summit + Himalayan Glacier Collapse + Hacking-for-Hire.” MERICS China Essentials, 3 September 2026. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/sco-summit-himalayan-glacier-collapse-hacking-hire
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2026b. China Is “Securitizing” Its Economy 23 April, 2026. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/china-securitizing-its-economy
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2025a. MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker 01/2025.https://merics.org/en/tracker/merics-china-security-and-risk-tracker-012025
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2025b. National Security White Paper + China-Latin America + US-China Relations. 22 May, 2025. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/national-security-white-paper-china-latin-america-us-chin a-relations
Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). 2022. MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker. February, 2022. https://merics.org/de/tracker/merics-china-security-and-risk-tracker-4
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2026. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference. 25 August 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202608/t20260825_12010141.html
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2026. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference. 28 August 2026. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202608/t20260828_12012299.html
National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). “Profound Changes Unseen in a Century”: China Assesses Its Security Environment. 15 May 2025. https://www.nbr.org/publication/profound-changes-unseen-in-a-century-china-assesses-its-sec urity-environment/
Reuters. 2026. “Bessent Expects New US Secondary Sanctions Weekly, Aiming to Increase Pressure on Iran.” 30 August 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/bessent-expects-new-us-secondary-sanctions-week ly-aiming-increase-pressure-iran-2026-08-30/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Reuters. 2026. Strait of Hormuz Commodity Vessel Transits Stay in Single Digits, Data Shows. 1 September 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/strait-hormuz-commodity-vessel-transits-stay-sin gle-digits-data-shows-2026-09-01/
Reuters. 2026. China to Raise Retail Gasoline, Diesel Price Caps amid Renewed Middle East Conflict. 31 July 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-raise-retail-gasoline-diesel-price-caps-amid-r enewed-middle-east-conflict-2026-07-31/
Reuters. 2026. Sinopec Steps Up Russian Oil Imports to Offset Mideast Supply Cuts, Traders and Tracker Say. 6 August 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sinopec-steps-up-russian-oil-imports-offset-mideast-supply-cuts-traders-tracker-2026-08-06/
Reuters. 2026. Bessent Says US to Impose “Toughest” Ever Sanctions on Iran, Urges China to Cooperate. 20 August 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-treasury-secretary-bessent-hold-press-confere nce-iran-on-monday-2026-08-20/
Reuters. 2026. “Iranian Oil Offers to Chinese Buyers Fall as US Blockade Bites, Sources Say.” 21 August 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-oil-offers-chinese-buyers-fall-us-blockade-b ites-sources-say-2026-08-21/
Reuters. 2026. Looming US Sanctions on Iran Put China Oil Buying in Spotlight. 24 August 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/looming-us-sanctions-iran-put-china-oil-buying-spo tlight-2026-08-24/
South China Morning Post. 2026. The Polar Pivot? China Debuts Regular Arctic Shipping Service as Iran War Drags On.18 August 2026. https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3364426/polar-pivot-china-debuts-r egular-arctic-shipping-service-iran-war-drags
The Guardian. 2026. China Turns to Arctic “Ice Silk Road” as Middle East Shipping Routes Face Disruption. 17 August 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/17/strait-hormuz-alternative-china-ships-north-sea-route-arctic-ice-silk-road
Toossi, Sina. 2026. “Trump’s ‘Economic D-Day’ Against Iran Risks Driving the Stakes Even Higher.” The Guardian, 30 August 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/aug/30/trump-economic-d-day-iran-stakes-higher-war
U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2026. Treasury Launches Unprecedented Campaign Against Iranian Regime on Economic D-Day. 24 August 2026. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0613